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THE PROBLEM OF THE INDETERMINATE DEFENDANT 




 The article discusses the problem of the indeterminate defendant in European tort law systems 
and in the projects aiming to unify tort law in Europe, such as Draft Common Frame of Reference 
and Principles of European Tort Law.  
 The given issue relates to a situation where there is a damage caused by one factor, yet upon 
available evidence one may indicate a few potential factors which might have led to the damage, 
but it cannot be ascertained which factor was the actual cause of it. The problem is addressed with 
reference to two scenarios. First, when there is a limited and known number of persons acting 
tortiously, each of whom potentially might have led to the damage, but only one of them had 
actually caused it. Second, when it is certain that one tortfeasor from the undetermined group  
of tortfeasors caused damage to some of the injured persons from the group of the injured persons, 
but it cannot be established precisely which tortfeasor caused damage to precisely which injured 
person.  
 In comparative law analysis, one may find various attempts to deal with the given issue, which 
come from the balance of ratios given to different solutions, as well as the legal possibilities  
or obstacles in national tort law systems. The main possibilities are: all-or-nothing approach, joint 
and several liability, and proportional liability. Those solutions are discussed in article in more 
detail with conclusion that the bold proposition of proportional liability presented in Principles  
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 2.1.  ALL-OR-NOTHING APPROACH 
 
 The all-or-nothing approach is a result of a strict interpretation of the 
conditio sine qua non requirement. Case-law and doctrine in some European 
countries support this view. It is, then, crucial to establish a causal relation 
between the individually recognised tortfeasor and the damage and hold 
him/her liable in full16. Taking into account that the essence of problem  
of alternative causation is inherent evidentiary problems in establishing 
which tortfeasor actually caused the damage, some jurisdictions in which 
the all-or-nothing approach is accepted are using certain ways to overcome 
those difficulties for the plaintiff’s benefit. For example, in Belgium the 
court may be willing to find upon circumstances of the case that the 
damage was actually the result of the activity of one of defendants (his/her 
act was the actual cause of damage) and hold him/her liable17. In some 
jurisdictions facilitation for the plaintiff’s claim follows from the proper 
establishment of the standard of proof or burden of proof. In English18  
and Danish law the applicable standard of proof is the preponderance  
of evidence, which means that the requirement of causation is met if it is 
more probable than not (more than 50%) that the defendant caused  
the damage. A similar approach is taken by Italian law, which applies  
the “theory of the most probable cause”. 
 
 2.2.  JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
 
 In Book VI – 4:103 of Draft Common Frame of Reference the rebuttable 
presumption of causing damage in the case of alternative causes is 
prescribed. The article reads as follows: “Where legally relevant damage 
may have been caused by any one or more of a number of occurrences  
for which different persons are accountable and it is established that the 
damage was caused by one of these occurrences but not which one, each 
person who is accountable for any of the occurrences is rebuttably 
                                                   
16  See: Infantino, Zervogianni, supra note 4. 
17  See: Court of Appeal of Brussels, 23.12.1927, RGAR 1928, no. 227. 
18  Solution to the problem of alternative causation in England is one of the most 
complicated ones. Depending on a case, it may be also proportional liability or joint and 
several liability (see below). 
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Introduction
The link between property rights and legitimate expectations is largely 
unsurprising. Current constitutional conceptions of property tend 
to include all kinds of legal rights with economic value. Apart from 
traditional forms of property (tangible assets), intellectual property rights, 
licences, and rights to certain amounts of money are also encompassed. 
What is more, as the present work will show, the guarantee of property 
amounts to a guarantee of an individual’s overall financial condition. This 
converts the guarantee of property into a general standard of fairness, 
aimed at protecting that condition against manifold interferences, ranging 
from traditional takings to taxation, withdrawal of licences and exclusive 
rights or imposition of financial liabilities.1 Not all these “properties” 
benefit from the same vesting qualities or resistance against change, this 
being precisely the entry point of legitimate expectations in the property 
guarantee realm. A property owner holds a right against expropriation 
without compensation, but he holds nothing but an expectation against 
certain rules introducing restraints on the use of property. This is the 
tertium comparationis of the present comparative exercise: the impairment 
of patrimonial interests by a change in law.
The two systems explored in this study – US constitutional law and 
the ECHR – are hugely influential from a global standpoint. In fact, the 
Supreme Court’s decisions on regulatory takings, especially Penn Central 
and Lucas, have seriously impacted investment treaty arbitration and 
investment treaty law in general. New investment treaties, like CETA or 
USMCA,2 make open references to “economic impact” or “investment-
backed expectations”3 – concepts distilled from the Supreme Court’s 
caseload. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), on the other 
hand, does not act as aggressively as other domestic or international 
legal systems in protecting economic power, wealth, and free market 
1 T. Allen, Property and the Human Rights Act 1998, Hart Publishing, 2005, p. 146; 
S. Montt, State liability in investment treaty arbitration, Hart Publishing, 2012, p. 182. 
2 EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA); United States 
Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA). 
3 Annex 8-A of CETA; Annex 11-B of USMCA.
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policies. However, it is a powerful watch-dog of governments’ behaviour 
towards individuals’ possessions, ensuring that domestic authorities act 
in a credible and consistent manner.4 In addition, the European Court of 
Justice’s protection of property draws largely upon the ECtHR’s reading 
on article 1 of Protocol No. 1.5
The first purpose of this article is to evaluate whether these systems 
are currently being structured and read in a way that enables them to 
accommodate a conception of property as a general standard of fairness. 
The second is to understand the meaning of legitimate expectations in the 
context of patrimonial interests. It seems crucial to discern whether the 
protection of patrimonial expectations gives emphasis to the government’s 
course of action, or rather to the predictability and impact of legal change 
on investors. Lastly, we intend to grasp the strength of the protection 
afforded to individuals’ legitimate expectations by calling attention to 
the way each system resorts to balancing exercises. 
That said, whereas Part I of the present article focuses on United States 
(US) constitutional law, Part II points to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). To accomplish the abovementioned objectives, 
both parts seek to describe the provisions based on which each system 
deals with legal changes affecting patrimonial expectations. Special 
attention will be awarded to recent trends in case-law, particularly 
concerning the standards of review and the key factors used in evaluating 
the predictability of a legal change. 
Part III closes the article with an analysis of the system’s key similarities 
and contrasts. Given the purposes of the text, it draws a comparative
4 L. Cotula, “Expropriation clauses and environmental regulation: Diffusion of 
law in the era of investment treaties”, Review of European, Comparative & International 
Environmental Law, Vol. 24, 2015, p. 278; A. B. Sanders, “Of all things made in America 
why are we exporting the Penn Central test?”, Nw. J. L. & Bus., Vol. 30, 2010, p. 339; 
M. Ruffert, “The protection of foreign direct investment by the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, German Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 4, 2000, p. 116; U. Kriebaum, 
“Is the European Court of Human Rights an alternative to Investor-State arbitration?”, 
in P. Dupuy, E. Petersmann, F. Francioni (eds.), Human Rights in International Investment 
Arbitration, Oxford, 2009, p. 219. 
5 M. R. Antinori, “Does Lochner live in Luxembourg? An analysis of property rights 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 18, 
1994, p. 1778. 
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framework based on three criteria: the scope and structure of property 
protection provisions, the features of legitimate expectation, and, lastly, 
the role of proportionality and standards of review. 
I. Th  Protection of Property and Legitimate 
   Expectations Under us Constitutional Law
The US constitution offers both individuals and corporations several 
devices to assure their legitimate expectations in obtaining patrimonial 
assets in the face of federal, state or municipal legislative changes. 
These devices are ultimately two: i) the due process of law clause of the 
Fourteenth amendment to the US constitution,6 often employed in the 
review of retroactive and retrospective legislation; ii) the takings clause,7 
held in the Fifth amendment and originally understood as a guarantee 
of compensation when the government exercises its eminent domain.
1. The Due Process of Law Clause
To b gin with, it is worth mentioning that the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence does not ignore the difference between primary and 
secondary retroactivity, and that it upholds the interpretative guideline, 
endorsed by countless legal systems, regarding the presumption of non-
retroactivity of laws.8 Therefore, in the absence of an explicit statement, 
6 “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” (Fourteenth amendment, Section 1). 
7 “Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation” 
(Fifth amendment). This study does not deal with the contract clause (article 1, section 10).
8 J. G. Laitos, “Legislative retroactivity”, Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. Law, Vol. 52, 1997, 
p. 81; L. Kaplow, “Transition Policy: A conceptual framework”, Journal of Contemporary 
Legal Issues, Vol. 13, 2003, p. 161; M. J. Graetz, “Retroactivity revisited”, Harvard Law Review, 
Vol. 98, 1984, p. 98; J. Fish, “Retroactivity and Legal Change”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 110, 
1997, p. 1063; A. C. Weiler, “Has due process struck out? The judicial rubberstamping 
of retroa tive economic laws”, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 41, 1992, p. 1076; A. Woolhandler, 
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laws shall be interpreted as applying to future events.9 Suffice to say that 
retroactive and retrospective laws, by affecting the initial value of an 
asset, can impair investors’ ability to take rational investment decisions 
and, thus, frustrate their legitimate expectations of profit. 
The meaning currently attached to the due process of law clause comes 
from the Supreme Court’s rejection of the Lochner jurisprudence,10 which 
was built on an intense scrutiny of the legislature’s police powers, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, on an almost irrefutable presumption that 
freedom of contract should prevail over social and economic regulation.11 
In fact, in the late nineteenth century the Supreme Court engaged in 
a substantive reading of the due process of law clause, which would foster, 
until the upcoming of New Deal, a case law premised on a constitutional 
reading which, by placing on the same level freedom of contract and other 
constitutional liberties, intended to scrutinise thoroughly the rationality 
behind the goals of the public powers instead of merely reviewing the 
rationality of the means chosen.12 The substantive due process was used 
to declare unconstitutional, not only policies regulating business entry, as 
succeeded in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,13 but also measures aimed at 
“Public Rights Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity”, The Georgetown Law Journal, 
Vol. 94, 2005, p. 1022. 
9 Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
10 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The case dealt with a New York law setting 
the maximum hours that backers could work. 
11 R. J. Krotoszynski, “Expropriatory intent: Defining the proper boundaries of 
substantive due process and the takings clause”, North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 80, 2002, 
p. 725; N. M. Merola, “Judicial review of State legislation: an ironic Lochnerian ideology 
when public sector labor contracts are impaired”, St. John’s Law Review, Vol. 84, 2010, 
p. 1181; T. B. Colby/P. J. Smith, “The return to Lochner”, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 100, 
2015, p. 529; E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, Aspen Publishers, 
2011, p. 634; M. P. Harrington, “Foreword: The dual dichotomy of retroactive lawmaking”, 
Roger Williams University Law Review, Vol. 3, 1997, p. 19; S. Pennicino, Contributo allo studio 
della ragionevolezza nel diritto comparato, Maggioli, 2012, 74; M. A. Schwartz, “A critical 
analysis of retroactive economic legislation: a proposal for due process revitalization in 
the economic arena”, Seton Hall Constitutional Law Journal, Vol. 9, 1999, p. 946; L. H. Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law (vol. 1), Foundation Press, 2000, p. 1343. 
12 Pennicino, supra note 11, p. 74; Chemerinsky, supra note 11, p. 644. 
13 New York Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). 
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protecting employees and consumers, as in Lochner or Adkins v. Children’s 
Hospital.14 
This understanding was strongly condemned by Justice Holmes, 
whose dissenting opinion in Lochner is often quoted: “a Constitution 
is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of 
paternalism and the organic relationship of the citizen to the State or 
of laissez-faire”.15 In fact, in the case that sealed the end of the Lochner 
era – Nebbia v. New York16 – the Supreme Court clearly addressed the 
judicial activism rationale underlying Justice Holmes’ dissent in Lochner, 
by stating that “in the absence of other constitutional restraints, a state 
is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed 
to promote public welfare”. 
The end of the so-called Lochner era is pivotal to fully understand 
why, nowadays, apart from the political and civil rights sector, the due 
process of law clause entails no more than a deference control towards 
government measures, standardly known as the “rational basis test” 
or “minimal scrutiny”.17 According to this standard, only measures not 
rationally established would be unconstitutional. 
A higher standard of review is not required even in relation to 
retroactive or retrospective tax legislation.18 In the first place, retroactive 
tax legislation is less prejudicial in terms of detrimental reliance. That is to 
say that, since tax laws do not typically seek to encourage or to discourage 
economic behaviour, it is not likely that individuals or corporations 
have altered their behaviour in the face of a prior piece of legislation.19 
Secondly, retroactive legislation is frequently a legislative necessity, 
14 Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
15 Lochner v. New York, supra note 10. 
16 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502. See also United States v. Carolene Products, 304 
U.S. 144 (1938), known for openly supporting a rational basis test when reviewing 
econo ic regulations: “the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be 
presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to 
be pronounced unconstitutional unless, in the light of the facts made known or generally 
assumed, it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some 
rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators”. 
17 Pennicino, supra note 11, p. 116. 
18 Schwartz, supra note 11, p. 946; Weiler, supra note 8, p. 1070. 
19 Welch v. Henry et al., 305 U.S. 134 (1938). 
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stressed by the need to recover excessive profits engendered by legislative 
failures – the so-called “loopholes” – and to achieve information regarding 
the sources of tax responsibility. However, this argument can only be 
endorsed provided that the retroactivity is short in time and adequate 
to meet that necessity,20 the best example being United States v. Carlton.21
Legislative interference with pending cases is also an issue under 
the due process clause. In United States v. Schooner Peggy,22 the Supreme 
Court announced the precedent still governing the topic, according to 
which courts, whether trial or appellate, should apply the law that exists 
at the time the decision is issued irrespective of whether that law existed 
at the time the lawsuit was initiated. This rule – the so-called “changed 
law rule” – knows certain limitations imposed largely by the need to 
protect the parties’ reliance on previous law,23 and, less frequently, by 
the separation of powers rationale.24
That is why to avoid Lochnerisation criticism, courts intending to 
review economic legislation under a more stringent standard would 
resort to other constitutional devices, such as the takings clause.
2. The Takings Clause
Just as in continental law, the compensation guarantee in case of 
expropriation is premised on the principle of equality as to the public 
charges. The argument is that compensation prevents governments from 
requiring some people alone to bear public burdens, which in all fairness 
and justice should be borne by the public as a whole.25 The takings clause 
offers protection not only against cases where the government us s its 
formal expropriation powers – the so-called eminent domain – but also 
against regulatory taking cases, i.e. cases where government regulation 
20 Weiler, supra note 8, p. 1109. 
21 United States v. Carlton. 512 U.S. 26 (1994). See also Justice Scalia dissenting. 
22 United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103 (1801). 
23 Chase Securities Corporation v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945); Campbell v. Holt, 115 
U.S. 620 (1885); Landgraf v. USI Film Products (note 9).
24 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871). 
25 See, for example, Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
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of private property is so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct 
expropriation. 
Therefore, the key issue for the courts to settle is whether a regulatory 
change produces effects tantamount to an expropriation, given that 
the establishment of that equivalence entails the duty to compensate. 
U. Kriebaum rightfully stresses that this train of thought relies on “all or 
nothing” reasoning.26
At first, the Supreme Court opted not to give in advance any fixed 
set of rules concerning the finding of that equivalence. Justice Holmes 
has provided some guidance in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,27 by 
holding that a taking takes place whenever government regulation “goes 
too far”. In Lingle v. Chevron,28 after almost a century of jurisprudential 
developments, the Supreme Court confirmed the existence of a particular 
type of regulatory takings – the so-called per se or categorical takings – 
which occur in view of regulations that entail physical intervention by 
government,29 or that eliminate all economically viable beneficial use 
of property. Outside this narrow realm, the court favours a casuistic 
assessment based on criteria that require a high amount of judicial 
discreti n.30
26 U. Kriebaum, “Regulatory Takings: Balancing the interests of the investor and the 
State”, Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 8, 2007, p. 719. 
27 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
28 Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
29 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871); Northern Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 
U.S. 635 (1879); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
30 Chemerinsky, supra note 11, p. 667; J. N. Bunch, “Takings, judicial takings, and 
patent law”, Texas Law Review, Vol. 83, 2005, p. 1751; M. C. Sochacki, “Takings law: the 
similarities and differences between the European Court of Human Rights and the United 
States Supreme Court”, Connecticut Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, 2009, p. 435; 
C. M. Rose, “Mahon reconstructed: why the takings issue is still a muddle”, Southern 
California Law Review, Vol. 57, 1984, p. 566; F. McCubbins, “Regulatory takings: What did 
Penn Central hold? Three decades of Supreme Court explanation”, Southern Law Journal, 
Vol. 21, 2011, p. 186; S. J. Eagle, “Penn Central and its reluctant muftis”, Baylor Law 
Review, Vol. 66, 2014, p. 1; J. W. Singer, “Regulatory Takings”, Ohio Northern University 
Law Review, Vol. 41, 2014, p. 601; W. A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics and 
Politics, Harvard University Press, 1995. 
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2.1. Penn Centralʼs Tests
The criteria were brought about in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New 
York City,31 a case dealing with urban planning and cultural heritage. 
Briefly, the appellant claimed that the refusal, by New York City, of 
a permit for building over the Grand Central Terminal - a building 
which was previously designated, under New York City’s Landmarks 
Preservation Law, as a “landmark”32 - effected a taking of its property 
without just compensation. Though stating that the assessment would 
ultimately depend on an ad hoc factual inquiry, the Supreme Court put 
forward three relevant criteria, viz. the economic impact of the regulation, 
the extent to which the regulation interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations, and the nature or character of the governmental 
regulation. The conclusion held by the Court was that no taking had 
occurred and, therefore, no compensation was due to the appellant. The 
Court highlighted: 
“The submission that appellants may establish a taking simply by 
showing that they have been denied the ability to exploit a prop rty 
interest that they heretofore had believed was available for developm nt 
is quite simply untenable (...). This Court focuses rather both on the 
character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference 
with rights in the parcel as a whole.”
2.1.1. The Character of the Governmental Regulation
The character of the governmental course of action intends to shed light on 
the public interest that the measure is aimed to achieve. The fact that the 
government is exercising its police powers, by ensuring the “protection 
of the lives, health and property of the citizens and the preservation of 
31 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
32 Under New York City’s landmark preservation law, the owner of a landmark 
building must keep the building’s exterior in good repair and seek the Commission’s 
approval before exterior alterations are made. 
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good order and the public morals”33 holds a negative but merely indicative 
value in assessing whether a taking has taken place. 
In other words, when the legislature puts into effect a programme 
“adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the 
common good”, courts rarely find a taking.34 This is so because these 
measures are envisaged as restraints on the use of property that are 
tantamount to public nuisances, i.e. as measures asking investors to 
address the costs of using the property in a certain way.35 For example, 
in Miller v. Schoene, the court held that the compulsory cut down of red 
cedar trees due to a communicable plant disease did not amount to 
a taking. In fact, “where the public interest is involved, preferment of 
that interest over the property interest of the individual, to the extent even 
of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the police 
power”.36 However, Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Keystone37 suggests that 
the nuisance rationale is different and narrower from the police powers 
doctrine, and that not every regulation based on essentially economic 
concerns should be insulated from the dictates of the Fifth amendment.38 
On the other hand, in Lingle, the Supreme Court reversed the 
prec dent brought about in Agins v. City of Tiburon,39 which assumed 
that the character of the governmental action should have a positive and 
ndatory value in the quest for a taking. This doctrine – known as the 
“substantive advances formula” – posits that a government regulation
33 Beer Company v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1877).
34 See, among others, Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1969); Keystone 
ituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 
(1928); Consolidated Rock Products v. City of Los Angeles (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 
U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
35 Fischel, supra note 30, p. 22 (“if a land use is itself noxious, dangerous, or causes 
a public nuisance, the legislature is free to regulate its use without compensation, even 
though the police power may cause great loss to property owner”). 
36 Miller v. Schoene (supra note 42) [emphasis added]. 
37 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis (supra note 34). 
38 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), also raises the question 
when noting that “the transition from our early focus on control of noxious uses to our 
contemporary understanding of the broad realm within which government may regulate 
without compensation was an easy one, since the distinction between harm preventing and 
benefit conferring regulation is often in the eye of the beholder” [emphasis added]. 
39 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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that does not substantially advance legitimate state interests amounts to 
an unconstitutional regulatory taking, irrespective of the magnitude of 
the burden it imposes upon private property rights. In Lingle, though, 
the court reinforced the weight of the three Penn Central’s criteria, by 
highlighting that, even if the government’s policy proves to be inefficient, 
no taking occurs without carefully considering the “actual burden 
imposed on property rights”.40
2.1.2. Investment-backed Expectations
Recognizing a taking rests also on the extent to which the regulation 
interferes with investors’ distinct investment-backed expectations. 
This tenet, which is also present in investment arbitration and ECtHR 
case law, has to do with feasible - i.e., viable - expectations of gain that 
might reasonably be expected to emerge from the investment before the 
regulatory change was enacted. 
Feasibility and reasonableness are crucial for fulfilling this test. To 
begin with, the feasibility of an expectation varies according to the stability 
and instability of the economic sector at stake.41 Despite the opacity of 
the judicial criteria, the Supreme Court provided, in Guggenheim v. City of 
Goleta,42 some insight on the subject by stating that “distinct investment-
backed expectations” means “reasonable probability” of obtaining 
a certain amount of income. By this token, the Court reveals its preference 
for a legal criterion, based on the feasibility of expectations evidenced by 
permits, promises, and public contracts,43 rather than mere opportunities 
of profit. Speculative profits and expectations contrary to the legal syste  
are similarly not worth protection. On the same judgment, when deciding 
whether a change in rent control for mobile homes effected a taking, the 
Court pointed out that the ordinance intended to grapple with exorbitant 
40 Lingle v. Chevron (supra note 28). 
41 Fisch, supra note 8, p. 1108. 
42 Guggenheim v. City of Goleta (9th Circ. Dec. 22, 2010) [emphasis added]. See also 
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) [“prediction of profitability is essentially a matter of 
reasoned speculation that courts are not especially competent to perform”]. 
43 Singer, supra note 30, p. 650. 
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rents during a period of a shortage of housing [“Speculative possibilities 
of windfalls do not amount to distinct investment-backed expectations (...)»]. 
Insofar as “distinct investment-backed expectations” are related to 
the probability of earning income by means of exploring the attributes 
inherent to property rights, special attention must be paid to occasions 
when the hindrance of these features unveils the event of a taking. 
When assessing the Penn Central’s criteria, the Supreme Court sets 
a high threshold for concluding that investment-backed expectations 
have been breached. It argues that breach occurs only if the regulation 
seizes some essential feature of the investment, or, alternatively, if the 
regulation removes the investor’s ability to obtain a reasonable return 
on his investment. In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis,44 the 
Supreme Court focused on quantifying the loss of profit imposed by the 
regulatory change so as to ascertain whether the investment remained 
economically viable. 
Despite its recurrent usage, the economic profitability criterion is far 
from having unanimous approval within the Supreme Court, as it cast 
doubts upon what is the proper denominator in the takings fraction.45
2.1.3. The Economic Impact of the Regulation  
    and Lucas per se Taking
Keystone suggests an overlap between investment-backed expectations 
and the economic impact of the regulation. This is because whenever the 
court finds an interference with investment-backed expectations, or, in 
other words, the destruction of the investment’s productive viability, the 
regulation’s burdensome impact upon investment becomes self-evident. 
44 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis (supra note 42). 
45 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis (supra note 42), Justice Rehnquist’s 
dissent opinion, joined by Justices Powell, O’Connor, and Scalia. Justice Rehnquist argued 
that the Court’s approach should be to evaluate a taking claim “by reference to the units of 
the property defined by state law”, instead of assessing it “by reference to some broader, 
yet undefined segment of property presumably recognized by state law”. See also Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council (supra note 46), footnote 7, and Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 
533 U.S. 606 (2001). P. C. McGinley, “Bundled rights and reasonable expectations: applying
20   |   Katarzyna Krupa-Lipińska 
 2.1.  ALL-OR-NOTHING APPROACH 
 
 The all-or-nothing approach is a result of a strict interpretation of the 
conditio sine qua non requirement. Case-law and doctrine in some European 
countries support this view. It is, then, crucial to establish a causal relation 
between the individually recognised tortfeasor and the damage and hold 
him/her liable in full16. Taking into account that the essence of problem  
of alternative causation is inherent evidentiary problems in establishing 
which tortfeasor actually caused the damage, some jurisdictions in which 
the all-or-nothing approach is accepted are using certain ways to overcome 
those difficulties for the plaintiff’s benefit. For example, in Belgium the 
court may be willing to find upon circumstances of the case that the 
damage was actually the result of the activity of one of defendants (his/her 
act was the actual cause of damage) and hold him/her liable17. In some 
jurisdictions facilitation for the plaintiff’s claim follows from the proper 
establishment of the standard of proof or burden of proof. In English18  
and Danish law the applicable standard of proof is the preponderance  
of evidence, which means that the requirement of causation is met if it is 
more probable than not (more than 50%) that the defendant caused  
the damage. A similar approach is taken by Italian law, which applies  
the “theory of the most probable cause”. 
 
 2.2.  JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
 
 In Book VI – 4:103 of Draft Common Frame of Reference the rebuttable 
presumption of causing damage in the case of alternative causes is 
prescribed. The article reads as follows: “Where legally relevant damage 
may have been caused by any one or more of a number of occurrences  
for which different persons are accountable and it is established that the 
damage was caused by one of these occurrences but not which one, each 
person who is accountable for any of the occurrences is rebuttably 
                                                   
16  See: Infantino, Zervogianni, supra note 4. 
17  See: Court of Appeal of Brussels, 23.12.1927, RGAR 1928, no. 227. 
18  Solution to the problem of alternative causation in England is one of the most 
complicated ones. Depending on a case, it may be also proportional liability or joint and 
several liability (see below). 
63Property Rights And Legitimate Expectations Under United States Constitutional Law…
Nonetheless, this criterion acquires an autonomous significance when 
the court concludes that the regulation completely deprives the owner of 
all economically beneficial use of the property. The so-called “sole effects 
doctrine” came about in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.46 It dealt 
with an act – the Beachfront Management Act – that barred the petitioner 
from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his South Carolina 
barrier island’s property. The Supreme Court called attention to the fact 
that the regulation target or character ought not to undermine the duty 
to pay compensation in cases where the regulation “has deprived the 
landowner of all economically beneficial uses”, since these cases evidence 
“a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form 
of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm”. 
Despite the global concerns that have erupted worldwide, particularly 
regarding the constraints on the government’s right to exercise its police 
powers,47 the Lucas per se taking remains statically insignificant.48 In fact, 
depriving the property owner of its most beneficial use is not tantamount 
to eliminating all reasonably economically viable use of that property. 
The factual ground of Lucas remains contentious, as it has been argued 
that the landowner could still sell its property at a reasonable price.49 In 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,50 a case dealing with permanent rejection, by
the Lucas categorical taking rule to severed mineral property interests”, Vermont Journal 
of Environmental Law, Vol. 11, 2010, p. 533; Rose, supra note 30, p. 566. 
46 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (supra note 46). 
47 R. Dolzer, “Indirect expropriations: new developments?”, N.Y.U. Environmental 
Law Journal, Vol. 11, 2002, p. 79; R. Dolzer/F. Bloch, “Indirect expropriations: Conceptual 
realignments?”, International Law Forum, Vol. 5, 2003, p. 163; Y. Fortier/S. L. Drymer, 
“Indirect expropriation in the law of international investment: I know it when I see It, 
or Caveat Investor”, Asia Pacific Law Review, Vol. 13, 2005, p. 93; S. Olynyk, “A balanced 
approach to distinguishing between legitimate regulation and indirect expropriation 
in investor-state arbitration”, Int’l Trade & Business Law Review, Vol. 15, 2002, p. 256; 
Kriebaum, supra note 26, p. 724; C. Henckels, “Indirect Expropriation and the right to 
regulate: Revisiting proportionality analysis and the standard of review in investor-state 
arbitration”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 15, 2012, p. 223. 
48 R. J. Lazarus, “Lucas unspun”, Southeastern Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 16, 
2008, p. 26. 
49 Ibid. p. 18. 
50 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (supra note 54). See also Andrus v. Allard (supra note 50), 
handling a prohibition on commercial transactions in eagle feathers. The Supreme Court 
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zoning authorities, of the owner’s development proposals of a parcel of 
land designated as “coastal wetlands”, the Supreme Court emphasized 
that “a regulation permitting a landowner to build a substantial residence 
on an 18-acre parcel does not leave the property economically idle”. 
By definition, a categorical taking refers to situations where 
compensation is due regardless of the character, nature, or justification 
behind the governmental measure. This was openly admitted in cases 
dealing with physical invasions, such as Loretto, which held that 
a permanent physical occupation of property constitutes a taking “without 
regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has 
only minimal economic impact on the owner”. Even though from the 
landowner’s standpoint a regulation encompassing Lucas’s features is 
the “equivalent of physical appropriation”,51 the reasoning underlying 
physical invasion takings is not fully transposable to Lucas. 
In fact, the Court has simultaneously undermined Lucas’s bright line 
rule by setting that a regulation that leaves property economically idle 
does not entail compensation provided that the limitation in question 
is inherent to the title itself, working as background principle that the 
State’s law of property and nuisance already placed upon landownership. 
Legal scholars argue that Lucas segregates one of Penn Central’s tests – 
the economic impact of the measure – by stressing its sufficiency to infer 
that a taking has emerged,52 or similarly, by a priori settling a normative 
conflict in favour of the duty to compensate. Given the definition of 
categorical takings endorsed by the Supreme Court, these assertions seem 
undisputable. However, the “already placed” nuisance exception to Lucas, 
coupled with its highly-demanding factual background, undermine the 
operative value of this per se rule. 
stated that, although the prohibition prevented the most profitable use of the appellees’ 
property, no taking had occurred insofar as they “retain the rights to possess and transport 
their property, and to donate or devise the protected birds”. 
51 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. (supra note 29). 
52 Fischel, supra note 30, p. 59 (“there are some regulatory schemes so close in spirit 
to eminent domain that they must be regarded as takings.”); Singer, supra note 30 at p. 633 
(“the Lucas rule against deprivation of all economically viable use is simply an extreme 
application of the economic impact factor“); M. Perkmans, “The concept of indirect 
20   |   Katarzyna Krupa-Lipińska 
 2.1.  ALL-OR-NOTHING APPROACH 
 
 The all-or-nothing approach is a result of a strict interpretation of the 
conditio sine qua non requirement. Case-law and doctrine in some European 
countries support this view. It is, then, crucial to establish a causal relation 
between the individually recognised tortfeasor and the damage and hold 
him/her liable in full16. Taking into account that the essence of problem  
of alternative causation is inherent evidentiary problems in establishing 
which tortfeasor actually caused the damage, some jurisdictions in which 
the all-or-nothing approach is accepted are using certain ways to overcome 
those difficulties for the plaintiff’s benefit. For example, in Belgium the 
court may be willing to find upon circumstances of the case that the 
damage was actually the result of the activity of one of defendants (his/her 
act was the actual cause of damage) and hold him/her liable17. In some 
jurisdictions facilitation for the plaintiff’s claim follows from the proper 
establishment of the standard of proof or burden of proof. In English18  
and Danish law the applicable standard of proof is the preponderance  
of evidence, which means that the requirement of causation is met if it is 
more probable than not (more than 50%) that the defendant caused  
the damage. A similar approach is taken by Italian law, which applies  
the “theory of the most probable cause”. 
 
 2.2.  JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
 
 In Book VI – 4:103 of Draft Common Frame of Reference the rebuttable 
presumption of causing damage in the case of alternative causes is 
prescribed. The article reads as follows: “Where legally relevant damage 
may have been caused by any one or more of a number of occurrences  
for which different persons are accountable and it is established that the 
damage was caused by one of these occurrences but not which one, each 
person who is accountable for any of the occurrences is rebuttably 
                                                   
16  See: Infantino, Zervogianni, supra note 4. 
17  See: Court of Appeal of Brussels, 23.12.1927, RGAR 1928, no. 227. 
18  Solution to the problem of alternative causation in England is one of the most 
complicated ones. Depending on a case, it may be also proportional liability or joint and 
several liability (see below). 
65Property Rights And Legitimate Expectations Under United States Constitutional Law…
2.2. The scope of constitutional Property:  
   Eastern Enterprises
As previously mentioned, a recent trend in the Fifth amendment case law 
has been its role in cases dealing with non-conventional property rights. 
This does not come as a surprise given the expansion that property rights 
have undergone. They include traditional property rights over tangible 
assets, as well as contractual and intellectual property rights,53 or, to 
sum up, any right capable of being object of a commercial transaction.54
However, doubts have been cast upon the defensibility of using 
the Fifth amendment for assessing claims that ordinarily would fit into 
the due process of law clause. At issue are those cases in which, having 
due regard to the nature of the government’s measure, it makes little 
sense to use a normative device whose consequence is the duty to pay 
compensation rather than the annulment of the measure.55 Further, this 
path suggests that the Fifth amendment is no longer just a standard 
used for controlling the government’s eminent domain power, but also 
a general guarantee against arbitrary, especially retroactive, legislation. 
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,56 for instance, dealt with the introduction 
of a fund aimed at providing health benefits to coal industry workers and 
to their dependents. The fund was to be financed by any coal operator, 
whether or not in the coal industry, including by Eastern Enterprises, 
a company who had left the industry in the early sixties. The Supreme 
Court concluded for the unconstitutionality of the act, and four out of 
nine judges support the verification of Penn Central’s tests. Regarding the 
expropriation in comparative public law – searching for light in the dark”, in S. W. Schill 
(eds.), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law, Oxford, 2008, p. 107. 
53 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. 
v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 
U.S. 722 (2002). 
54 P. C. Choharis, “U.S. Courts and the international law of expropriation: toward 
a new model for breach of contract”, Southern California Law Review, Vol. 80, 2007, p. 15; 
Woolhandler, supra note 8, p. 1015; Bunch, supra note 30, p. 1747.
55 Krotozynski, supra note 14, p. 723. 
56 Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). 
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economic impact of the measure, the Court – in contradiction with former 
case law – held that the responsibility Eastern was called to bear was 
substantial, in the sense that it would deprive the company of the amounts 
covered by the fund. The event of a taking was not eroded by the fact the 
government had not specified the assets required to satisfy the pecuniary 
obligation. In our opinion, this a rather useless assertion inasmuch as 
any investor called upon to pay a pecuniary obligation is deprived of the 
amounts needed to comply with it. Moreover, the Court’s reasoning in 
Eastern seems to recover the “conceptual severance”, a doctrine openly 
rejected in Penn Central57 and that obstructs government’s chances of 
winning a Fifth amendment case.58
2.3. Regulatory Takings: How Many Standards?
Our analysis of the character of the governmental regulation test has 
revealed a consistent engagement with a reasonableness standard of 
scrutiny, based on the assumption that the government’s exercise of 
its police powers is presumed to be constitutionally valid. In line with 
Consolidated Rock Products, this is a clear recognition of the “principle of 
the division of functions between the legislative and judicial branches”.59 
Occasionally, though, considering that the Fifth amendment calls 
for an assessment of the burden that the law has imposed upon a few 
individuals,60 the Supreme Court goes for a heightened standard of 
review. This is true for urban law exactions, which occur when the 
government makes the issuance of building permits depend on the 
performance of certain non-straightforward conditions.61 
57 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City (note 31) [“takings jurisprudence 
does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether 
a particular governmental action had effected a taking”]. 
58 S. Montt, supra note 1, p. 189; Fischel, supra note 30, p. 49. 
59 Consolidated Rock Products v. City of Los Angeles (supra note 34). 
60 Singer, supra note 30, p. 636. 
61 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). See also Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), where the Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality 
of the granting of a permit, by the California Coastal Commission, upon the condition 
that the appellants allow the public an easement to pass across their beach. 
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In Dolan v. City of Tigard62, the authorities decided that a building 
permit was contingent on the construction, by the plaintiffs, of a pedestrian 
pathway, which would solve some current traffic problems. When 
finding whether a taking had occurred, the Supreme Court stressed 
that it was pivotal to know “whether the essential nexus exists between 
the legitimate state interest and the permit condition” and, additionally, 
in resemblance to proportionality in the narrow sense, whether “the 
degree of the exactions demanded by the city’s permit conditions bear 
the required relationship to the projected impact of petitioner’s proposed 
development”.63 
The premise of this heightened standard is that in Dolan, as well as 
in Nollan64, the exactions would have constituted a categorical taking 
(physical invasion) if imposed irrespectively of the granting of the 
building permit. By demanding a “reasonable relationship” between 
the exactions and the interests that land authorities sought to pursue, 
the court overtly asked for a standard tougher than the rational basis 
test, namely a “rough proportionality” test.65 
Subsequent cases have revealed the extent to which the Supreme 
Court intends to apply this new and more substantial standard of 
scrutiny. In City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes66, confronted with the 
successive rejection by the land authority, of the property owner’s 
proposals to develop the property, coupled with the imposi ion of 
demanding exactions, the court refused to apply the Nollan/Dolan rough 
proportionality test, thereby stressing that the latter only targets cases 
62 Dolan v. City of Tigard (supra note 61). 
63 Fischel, supra note 30, p. 58 [“On this rule, a community could give an exception 
to a leash law to dog owners who contributed to clean-up fund, but it could not give an 
exception to dog owners who promised to paint their houses white”]. 
64 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (supra note 61) [“had California simply 
required the Nollans to make an easement across their beachfront available to the public on 
a permanent basis in order to increase public access to the beach, rather than conditioning 
their permit to rebuild their house on their agreeing to do so, we have no doubt there would 
have been a taking”]. 
65 J. D. Echeverria, “Koontz: the very worst takings decision ever?”, N.Y. University 
Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 22, 2015, p. 6; McCubbins, supra note 30, p. 186; Chemerinsky, 
supra note 11, p. 681. 
66 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
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where a building permit is issued following the landowner’s acceptance 
of the (excessive) exactions. Recently, however, in Koontz v. St. Johns 
River Water Management District, the City of Monterey precedent was 
reversed, as the court held that resorting to Nollan/Dolan principles was 
not dependent, firstly, on whether the government approved or denied 
a permit, and, secondly, on whether the exactions imposed concerned 
a parcel of land or involved rather the payment of money. Underlying 
this enlargement is the need to prevent governments from evading the 
Nollan/Dolan rationale in situations where, notwithstanding its financial 
character, the exaction bears a special connection with a specific parcel 
of real property.67 
The decision raises many doubts and thorough concerns.68 For instance, 
if monetary exactions are thereafter subject to the rough proportionality 
test, how to distinguish them from property taxes, which would be 
normally assessed under the rational basis test? If the monetary exaction 
works as a per se taking, because of the link established with a specific 
parcel of land, why run the Nollan/Dolan inquiries at all? 69 
The Koontz decision, coupled with Eastern Enterprises and the reversal 
of City of Monterrey, embody an expansionary trend in takings clause 
jurisprudence. It operates, firstly, through the adoption of a heightened 
st ndard of review in urban law, which narrows the measures taken as 
restraints on the use of property not requiring compensation, and secondly, 
by means of including the imposition of monetary responsibilities in the 
regulatory takings realm. Although this trend is not ignored in other 
legal systems,70 particularly in those not admitting a substantive due
67 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 530 U.S. (2013) [“because of the 
direct link between the government’s demand and a specific parcel of real property, this 
case implicates the central concern in Nolan and Dollan: the risk that the government may 
deploy its substantial power and discretion in land-use permitting to pursue governmental 
ends that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to the effects of the proposed 
use of the property at issue”]. 
68 Echeverria, supra note 65, p. 6; I. Piedra, “Confusing regulatory takings with 
regulatory exactions: the Supreme Court gets lost in the swamp of Koontz”, Environmental 
Affairs, Vol. 41, 2014, p. 555. See also Justice Kagan’s dissent opinion in Koontz. 
69 Echeverria, supra note 65, p. 41. 
70 See Part III. 
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process reading, it is still somewhat disturbing since it might work as 
a disguised surrogate of a less-deferral due process clause.71 Plus, the 
financial consequences of such approach could be burdensome, owing to 
the takings clause inflexible all-or-nothing approach to regulatory takings. 
3. Summary of Party I
Despite their different constitutional location and historical background, 
the due process clause and the takings clause are alternative texts, in 
the sense that they can be mobilize to address the same constitutional 
issue - legislative interferences with legitimate expectations – by means 
of different remedies and standards of scrutiny. 
We highlighted that, since the end of the Lochner era, the Supreme 
Court has attached socio-economic legislation with a presumption of 
constitutionality, meaning that it will not strike down retroactive or 
prospective legislation unless it proves to be invalid pursuant to a rational 
basis test. Fearing accusations of judicial activism, the Supreme Court 
started to bring in precedents allowing for a stricter standard of review 
under the takings clause. In spite of Penn Central and Lucas’ worldwide 
impact, particularly through investment treaties and investment 
arbitration, the expansionary trend in takings clause case-law res s upon 
Nollan/Dolan/Koontz’s rough proportionality test, on the one hand, and 




In this part, we will address how the ECtHR has been reading art. 1 
of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR, the provision aimed the protection of 
71 J. L. Kainen, “The historical framework for reviving constitutional protection f r 
property and contract rights”, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 79, 1993, p. 93. 
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property, frequently invoked in conjunction with art. 6 of the ECHR, 
which protects the right to a fair trial.72 
1. The Structure of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
Briefly, in structural terms, art. 1 contains three sentences addressing 
different types of government interference with property. 
The first sentence (Rule 1) holds that “every natural or legal person 
is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions”. It serves as 
a general “catch-all” category for interferences not covered by the 
remaining sentences.73 Rule 1 covers a wide range of situations, such as the 
refusal of access to land occupied by armed forces, in Loizidou v. Turkey,74 
regulations on compensation for persons whose property was taken
72 R. Higgins, “The taking of property by the State: recent developments in International 
l w”, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 176, 1992, p. 355; Allen, supra note 1, p. 107; Sochacki, supra 
note 30, p. 435 et seq.; P. Popelier, “Legitimate expectations and the law maker in the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights”, European Human Right Law Review, Vol. 1, 
2006, p. 10; S. L. Escarcena, “Interferences with property under European Human Rights 
Law”, Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, 2012, p. 513; Perkmans, supra note 52, 
p. 112; Kriebaum, supra note 4, p. 234; L. Sermet, “La Convention européenne des Droits 
de l’Homme et le droit de propriété” (The European Convention on Human Rights and 
the right to property), Dossier sur les Droits de l’Homme, Vol. 11, 1999, p. 11; C. Quézel-
Ambrunaz, “L’acception européenne du bien en mal de définition”, Recueil Dalloz, Vol. 31, 
2010, p. 2024; A. R. Çoban, “Inflation and Human Rights: protection of property against 
inflation under the European Convention on Human Rights”, Essex Human Rights Review, 
Vol. 2, 2005, p. 62; P. Sales, “Property and Human Rights: Protection, expansion and 
disruption”, Judicial Review, Vol. 11, 2006, p. 141; R. Hostiou, “La Cour européenne des 
Droits de l’Homme et la théorie de l’expropriation indirecte” (The European Court of 
Human Rights and the theory of indirect expropriation), Rev. trim. dr. h., Vol. 7, 2007, p. 385; 
M. Sigron, Legitimate expectations under article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the European Convention 
on Hu an Rights, Intersentia, 2014; R. Lang, “Unlocking the First Protocol: Protection of 
Property and the European Court of Human Rights”, Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 29, 
2006, p. 205; S. Drooghenbroeck, “The concept of “possessions” within the meaning of 
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, The European Legal Forum, Issue 7, 2000, p. 437;
73 Amongst many, Jokela v. Finland, Application no, 28856/95, Judgment of 21.5.2002, 
para. 49; Back v. Finland, Application no, 37598/97, Judgment of 20.7.2004, para. 58. 
74 Loizidou v. Turkey, Judgment of 18.12.1996, Series A No. 310, para. 63. 
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over by virtue of certain statues enacted under the totalitarian regime, 
in Broniowski v. Poland,75 a law prescribing that an arbitration clause 
contained in a concession contract was no longer valid notwithstanding 
the fact that the arbitral court had already issued a decision requiring the 
State to pay compensation, in Stran Greek Refineries v. Greece,76 delays in 
VAT refunding, in Intersplav v. Ukraine,77 termination of a lease without 
prior notice, in Bruncrona v. Finland,78 or social allowances and pensions 
reductions, in Kjartan Ásmundsson v. Iceland.79 
The second sentence (Rule 2) sets down that “no one shall be deprived 
of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions 
provided by law or by the general principles of international law.” It is
75 Broniowski v. Poland, Application no. 31443/96, Judgment of 22.6.2004, para. 136. 
The end of the communist regime in Eastern Europe led to a sequence of claims, ranging 
from compensation issues, restitution issues and enforcement of judgments. See, for 
example, Stefanov v. Bulgaria, Application no. 35399/05, Judgment of 27.10.2015, Stojanovski 
and others v. TFYR of Macedonia, Application no. 14174/09, Judgment of 23.10.2014, Driza 
v. Albania, Application no. 33771/02, Judgment of 2.6.2008, Dukic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Application no. 4543/09, Judgment of 19.6.2012, Dumbrava v. Romania, Application no. 
25234/03, Judgment 17.2.2009, Gjonbocari and others v. Albania, 23.10.2007, no. 10508/02, 
Hadzhigeorgievi v. Bulgaria, Application no. 41064/05, Judgment of 16.7.2013, Ilieva and 
others v. Bulgaria, Application no. 17705/05, Judgment of 3.2.2015, J.S and A.S v. Poland, 
Application no. 40732/98, Judgment of 12.10.2005, Jasiuniené v. Lithuania, Application 
no. 41510/98, Judgment of 6.6.2003, Karaivanova and Mileva v. Bulgaria, Application no. 
35857/05, Judgment of 17.6.2014, Kehaya and others v. Bulgaria, Applications no. 47797/99 
and 68698/01, Judgment of 12.1.2006, and Lindner and Hammermayer v. Romania, Application 
no. 35671/97, Judgment of 3.12.2002. 
76 Stran Greek Refineries v. Greece, Judgment of 9.12.94, Series A No. 301-B, para. 66. 
77 Intersplav v. Ukraine, Application no. 803/02, Judgment of 23.5.2007, para. 33. See 
also Aon Conseil et Courtage S.A and another v. France, Application no. 70160/01, Judgment 
of 25.1.2007, para. 44; “Bulves” AD v. Bulgaria, Application no. 3991/03, Judgment of 
22.4.2009, para. 61. 
78 Bruncrona v. Finland, Application no. 41673/98, Judgment of 16.2.2005, para. 79. 
79 Kjartan Ásmundsson v. Iceland, Application no. 60669/00, Judgment of 12.10.2004, 
para. 40. See also Althoff and others v. Germany, Application no. 5631/05, Judgment of 
8.3.2012, para. 47, Andrejeva v. Latvia, Application no. 55707/00, Judgment of 18.2.2009, 
para. 80, and Buczkiewicz v. Poland, Application no. 10446/03, Judgment of 26.2.2008, para. 
65, in which, similarly to Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, Judgment of 23.7.1982, Series 
A No. 52, the court dealt with a measure that, though leaving intact the applicants’ right 
to use and dispose of their possessions, significantly reduced the practical and effective 
exercise of that right. 
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well-known that the ECtHR has carved out a thoroughly strict concept of 
what a deprivation of possessions should amount to, thereby restricting 
the situations that ought to be qualified as de facto expropriations. In fact, 
cases where a deprivation was not found80 unveil that the court opted 
for a purely legal standard rather than an economic or patrimonial one, 
which stresses that nothing but definitive and complete deprivations of 
property amount to a de facto expropriation under the second sentence.81 
Perhaps more clearly, “as long as the applicants remained free to sell and 
use their land, no rule 2 deprivations had occurred”.82 
80 See, for instance, Mellacher et al. v. Austria, Judgment of 19.12.1989, Series A No. 169, 
para. 44, Stretch v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 44277/98, Judgment of 3.12.2003, 
par . 36, Hellborg v. Sweden, Application no. 47473/99, Judgment of 28.5.2006, para. 45, 
and Lindheim and others v. Norway, Applications no. 13221/08 and 2139/10, Judgment 
of 22.10.2012, para. 78. In the latter decision, when evaluating a regulation that granted 
lessees the right to claim extension of their lease on the same conditions as previously, 
the Court admitted that “the low level of annual rents in their case (less than 0.25% 
of the plots’ alleged market value) and the indefinite duration of the impugned rent 
limitation interfered to a very significant degree with the enjoyment of their possessions. 
Notwithstanding, the Court was not persuaded that “the application of section 33 of the 
Ground Lease Act to them amounted to expropriation or de facto expropriation, or that 
it meant that all meaningful use had been taken away.” (para. 77). 
81 The recognition of de facto expropriations has been scarce and rather incoherent: 
Papamichalopoulos v. Greece, Judgment of 24.6.1993, Series A No. 260-B, para. 53, Pressos 
Compania Naviera SA and others v. Belgium, Judgment of 20.11.1995, Series A No. 332, 
para. 34, Kehaya v. Bulgaria (supra note 75), para. 77, James v. The United Kingdom, Judgment 
of 21.2.1986, Series A No. 98, para. 38, and Albergas and Arlauskas v. Lithuania, Application 
no. 17978/05, Judgment of 27.8.2014, para. 55. Yet, in cases dealing with penalties or 
sanctions, although acknowledging that the government’s regulations had fully deprived 
the owner of its property, the ECtHR did not find a rule 2 deprivation. For instance, in 
Air Canada v. The United Kingdom, Judgment of 5.5.1995, Series A No. 316-A, concerning 
the seizure of an aircraft due to the transportation of cannabis, the Court sustained that 
“t e seizure and demand for payment were to be seen as part of the system for the 
control of the use of an aircraft (...)”, meaning that no transfer of ownership has occurred 
(para. 32). The seizure of goods in the context of criminal proceedings might, however, 
be examined under Rule 2 (deprivation), particularly if the confiscation is permanent 
and entails a conclusive transfer of property, as occurred in B. K. M. Lojistik Tasimacilik 
Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Slovenia, Application no. 42079/12, Judgment of 17.01.2017, para. 
38, and Andonoski v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Application no. 16225/08, 
J dgment of 17.09.2015. 
82 Allen, supra note 1, p. 113. 
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The third sentence (Rule 3) is premised on the view that the social 
function of property83 demands governments to enforce rules “to 
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest”. 
It includes planning restrictions, like those in Pine Valley Developments 
v. The United Kingdom84 and Hamer v. Belgium,85 withdrawal of licences, 
in Tre Traktorer Aktiebolag v. Sweden86 or in Brosset-Triboulet and others v. 
France,87 confiscation of property, in Handyside v. United Kingdom88 and 
Air Canada v. The United Kingdom,89 rent controls, extension of the validity 
of existing leases and temporary suspension of enforcement of court 
orders, in Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy,90 or the slaughter of animals at risk, in 
Chagnon et Fournier v. France.91 
As recurrently stressed by the ECtHR, to conform to the requirements 
of art. 1, the interference must comply with the legality requirement, 
which will not be addressed in the present work, and with the principle 
of fair balance, within the terms we will discuss below.
2. Possessions Under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
The ECtHR has evinced its preference for a rather broad concept of 
“possessions”, which encompasses any pecuniary interests that exist or 
83 M. L. Padelletti, La tutela della proprietà nella Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo, 
Milano: Giuffrè, 2003, p. 13 [“l’obiettivi limitato di garantire in singolo dalla confisca (...) 
senza per altro escludere l’esercizio de un potere conformativo della proprietà da parte 
degli stati, al fine di garantire la funzion soziale”].
84 Pine Valley Developments v. The United Kingdom, Judgment of 29.11.91, Series A 
No. 222, para. 56. 
85 Hamer v. Belgium, Judgment of 27.11.2007, no. 21861/03, para. 77. 
86 Tre Traktorer Aktiebolag v. Sweden, Judgment of 7.7.1987, Series A No. 159, para. 55. 
87 Brosset-Triboulet and others v. France, Application no. 34078/02, Judgment of 
29.3.2010, para. 83. Related to the withdrawal or rejection of environmental permits, see 
Fredin v. Sweden, Judgment of 18.2.1990, Series A No. 192, para. 47, and Huoltoasema Matti 
Éuren Oy and others v. Finland, Application no. 26654/08, Judgment of 19.1.2010, para. 36. 
88 Handyside v. The United Kingdom, Judgment of 7.12.76, Series A No. 24, para. 62. 
89 Air Canada v. The United Kingdom (supra note 81), para. 34. 
90 Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy, Application no. 22774/93, Judgment of 28.7.1999, para. 46. 
91 Chagnon et Fournier v. France, Applications no. 44174/06 and 44190/06, Judgment 
of 15.7.2010, para. 36. 
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will very likely exist in an individual’s patrimonial sphere.92 In addition, it 
is worth saying that the concept protects not only each specific pecuniary 
interest or asset, but also an individual’s financial condition as a whole. That 
is why the levying of taxes as well as the imposition of other monetary 
liabilities constitutes an interference with the right guaranteed in art. 1 of 
Protocol no. 1, as the court stated in Arnaud and others v. France93 or Gáll 
v. Hungary.94 This conclusion draws solely from the judicial reading of 
the Convention’s disposition and it is neither supported nor disturbed 
by the second paragraph of art. 1, since the right of the state to “secure 
the payment of taxes” is not the same thing as the imposition of taxes. 
As a consequence of this broad scope, the court appraised as protected 
“possessions” an assortment of tangible assets (physical goods), earned 
income, such as salaries, allowances, and pensions,95 amounts awarded in 
judicial proceedings96 or amounts related to electricity and gas payments,97 
intellectual property rights, company shares,98 foreign currency savings,99 
fishing rights, pecuniary interests in estates,100 and contractual rights to 
a certain amount.101 This list requires some interpretative remarks. 
92 Therefore, as Padelletti, supra note 83, p. 42, rightfully points out, the concept of 
“possessions” bears a similarity to the common law concept of “estate”. 
93 Arnaud and others v. France, Applications no. 36918/11, 36963/11, 36967/11, 
36969/11, 36970/11 and 36971/11, Judgment of 15.1.2015, para. 24. 
94 Gáll v. Hungary, Application no. 49570/11, Judgment of 4.11.2013, para. 55. 
95 Lelas v. Croatia, Application no. 55555/08, Judgment of 20.8.2010, para. 58. 
96 Amat-G LTD and Mebaghishvili v. Georgia, Application no. 2507/03, Judgment 
of 15.2.2006, para. 56, Eydelman and other “Emigrant Pensioners” v. Russia, Applications 
no. 7119/05, 9992/07, 10359/07, 13476/07, 3565/08, 10628/08, 33904/08, 33918/08, 
40058/08, 42112/08, 42115/08 and 60792/08, Judgment of 4.2.2011, para. 32, Khrykin v. 
Russia, Application no. 33186/08, Judgment of 19.7.2011, para. 54, and Kuzmina v. Russia, 
Application no. 15242/04, Judgment of 2.7.2009, para. 30. 
97 Budchenko v. Ukraine, Application no. 38677/06, Judgment of 24.4.2014, para. 36. 
98 Lekic v. Slovenia, Application no. 36480/07, Judgment of 14.2.2017, para. 69–71. 
99 A and B v. Montenegro, Application no. 37571/05, Judgment of 5.3.2013, para. 67; 
Alisic and others v. TFYR of Macedonia, Application no. 60642/08, Judgment of 16.7.2014, 
para. 97; Kovacic and others v. Slovenia, Application no. 44574/98, 45133/98 and 48316/99, 
Judgment of 3.10.2008. 
100 Fokas v. Turkey, Application no. 31206/02, Judgment of 29.12.2009, para. 42; Fabris 
v. France, Application no. 16574/08, Judgment of 7.2.2013, para. 55. 
101 Asito v. Moldova, Application no. 40663/98, Judgment of 8.2.2006, para. 60, and 
B ck v. Finland (supra note 73). 
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In the light of the ECtHR case law, the concept of legitimate expectations 
acquires a different meaning depending on the stage of judicial reasoning 
at which it is applied. Indeed, when the Court seeks to appraise whether 
a “possession” under art. 1 is at stake, the concept of legitimate expectations 
bears some resemblance to the Supreme Court’s “investment-backed 
expectations”, i.e. to the legal probability of earning a certain amount of 
money. In this regard, a legitimate expectation is related to possessions 
not yet in existence and depicts the likelihood of success, under the 
national law, of claims able to generate a future amount of money. 
The expectation of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property 
right is legitimate provided that it has a sound legal basis under the 
national legal system and/or under the established case law and refers 
to property rights, which means that “no such expectation could come 
into play in the absence of an asset falling within the ambit of articl 1 
of Protocol No. 1”.102 The difference between legitimate expectations and 
“existing” possessions does not concern the underlying types of asse s, 
but is fundamentally a question of degree as to the potency of certainty 
of these assets.103 As the court hold in Draon v. France104 in reference to 
a former decision: 
“The legitimate expectation identified in the Pressos Companía Naviera 
S.A and others case did not in itself constitute a proprietary interest; it 
related to the way in which the claim qualifying as an asset would be 
treated under domestic law, and in particular to the reliance on the fact 
that the established case-law of the national courts would continue to be 
applied in respect of damage which had already occurred.”
102 Kopecky v. Slovakia, Application no. 44912/98, Judgment of 28.9.2004, para. 48. 
103 Sochacki, supra note 30, p. 466. 
104 Draon v. France, Application no. 1513/03, Judgment of 6.10.2005, Applicati n 
no. 1513/03, para. 67. 
20   |   Katarzyna Krupa-Lipińska 
 2.1.  ALL-OR-NOTHING APPROACH 
 
 The all-or-nothing approach is a result of a strict interpretation of the 
conditio sine qua non requirement. Case-law and doctrine in some European 
countries support this view. It is, then, crucial to establish a causal relation 
between the individually recognised tortfeasor and the damage and hold 
him/her liable in full16. Taking into account that the essence of problem  
of alternative causation is inherent evidentiary problems in establishing 
which tortfeasor actually caused the damage, some jurisdictions in which 
the all-or-nothing approach is accepted are using certain ways to overcome 
those difficulties for the plaintiff’s benefit. For example, in Belgium the 
court may be willing to find upon circumstances of the case that the 
damage was actually the result of the activity of one of defendants (his/her 
act was the actual cause of damage) and hold him/her liable17. In some 
jurisdictions facilitation for the plaintiff’s claim follows from the proper 
establishment of the standard of proof or burden of proof. In English18  
and Danish law the applicable standard of proof is the preponderance  
of evidence, which means that the requirement of causation is met if it is 
more probable than not (more than 50%) that the defendant caused  
the damage. A similar approach is taken by Italian law, which applies  
the “theory of the most probable cause”. 
 
 2.2.  JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
 
 In Book VI – 4:103 of Draft Common Frame of Reference the rebuttable 
presumption of causing damage in the case of alternative causes is 
prescribed. The article reads as follows: “Where legally relevant damage 
may have been caused by any one or more of a number of occurrences  
for which different persons are accountable and it is established that the 
damage was caused by one of these occurrences but not which one, each 
person who is accountable for any of the occurrences is rebuttably 
                                                   
16  See: Infantino, Zervogianni, supra note 4. 
17  See: Court of Appeal of Brussels, 23.12.1927, RGAR 1928, no. 227. 
18  Solution to the problem of alternative causation in England is one of the most 
complicated ones. Depending on a case, it may be also proportional liability or joint and 
several liability (see below). 
76 Marta Nunes Vicente
In this sense, the detection of a “possession” is premised upon a factual 
enquiry, which requires the Court to operate a thorough scrutiny of the 
State party legal system and case law. For instance, in Kopecky v. Slovakia,105 
a case dealing with a claim for the restitution of coins confiscated during 
the communist period, the court concluded that the applicant did not have 
a “possession” under art. 1 of Protocol No. 1, since there were doubts 
concerning the compliance with statutory conditions for restitution.106 
Suffice to say that, in establishing these requirements, the court intends 
to exclude from the chapeau of art. 1 the claims that embody nothing but 
a mere hope of acquiring a possession.107 
Even though this is to a large extent a fact-based analysis, the court 
has a few times engaged in a normative assessment of the domestic 
case law in order to conclude that the claimant benefited after all from 
a legitimate expectation, and consequently, a possession under art. 1. The 
Djidrovski v. The Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia case is a good 
example of this avenue. It handled the refusal, by Macedonia,108 to assume 
the obligations of the former Yugoslav army, a fact that prevented the 
claimant - a former officer of the army - from acquiring a socially owned 
apartment at a beneficial price. In the judgment, the Court advanced that, 
notwithstanding the domestic court’s refusal to uphold the claimant’s 
right, he had a legitimate expectation that the purchase would take place 
at a r duced price.
105 Kopecky v. Slovakia (supra note 102), para. 58. 
106 In Lay Lay v. Malta, Application no. 30633/11, Judgment of 23.7.2013, para. 78, 
and Albu and others v. Romania, Application no. 34796/09 and 63 other cases, Judgment of 
10.5.2012, para. 47, for example, the ECtHR has also concluded for lack of a “possession” 
under article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 
107 See, in this sense, Cazacu v. Moldova, 23.10.2007, no. 40117/02, para. 37, “Bulves” 
AD v. Bulgaria (note 133), para. 53, Van der Mussele v. Belgium, 23.11.1983, no. 8919/89, 
para. 48, Basarba Ood v. Bulgaria, 7.4.2010, no. 77660/01, para. 40, Beshiri and others v. Albania, 
12.2.2007, no. 7352/03, para. 77, Béláné Nagy v. Hungary, 10.2.2015, no. 53080/13, para. 35, 
Jantner v. Slovakia, 9.7.2003, no. 39050/97, para. 33, Bellizzi v. Malta, 28.11.2011, no. 46575/09, 
para. 74, and Ramaer and Van Willigen v. The Netherlands, 23.10.2012, no. 34880/12, 
para. 80–81. 
108 Djidrovski v. TFYR of Macedonia, 24.2.2005, Application no. 46447/99, para. 85. 
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3.1.1. Judicial Proceedings and the Right to a Fair Trial
Most often, the Court assesses claims involving non-yet-existing 
“possessions” under art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 in conjunction or in addition 
to art. 6 of the Convention, which contains the right to a fair trial. The 
issue underneath these claims concerns, on the one hand, the influence of 
legislative or administrative measures on pending judicial proceedings, 
and, on the other, undue difficulties created by state organs in the 
enforcement of judicial decisions. 
It is worth mentioning that these difficulties can be labelled either 
as interferences with existing possessions109 or as interferences with 
legitimate expectations, despite the grounds for the distinction not 
being clearly put forward in the case law.110 In fact, whereas in Sierpinski 
v. Poland,111 a case dealing with the annulment of an administrative 
decision that transferred private property to the municipality during 
the communist regime, the Court held that a judicial decision awarding 
a fixed amount of compensation provided the claimant with a “legitimate 
expectation”, in Dementyev v. Russia,112 a military court decision awarding 
a certain amount originating from daily allowances was considered 
to be a “possession”, without any reference being made to legitimate 
expectations. 
The caseload depicts more consistency when approaching legislative 
and administrative interferences with judicial disputes, aimed at 
influencing the outcome of judicial proceedings, at preventing proceedings 
from being open, or at rendering void final and enforceable decisions. 
Following the leading case Pressos Compania Naviera SA and others 
v. Belgium,113 the Court has on many occasions stated that interferences 
109 Kehaya and others v. Bulgaria (supra note 75), para. 72. 
110 See, among others, Dementyev v. Russia, Application no. 3244/04, Judgment of 
6.2.2009, para. 31, Bodrov v. Russia, Application no. 17472/04, Judgment of 12.2.2009, 
para. 26, Agasaryan v. Russia, Application no. 39897/02, Judgment of 20.2.2009, para. 31, 
and Ambruosi v. Italy, Application no. 31227/96, Judgment of 19.1.2001. 
111 Sierpinski v. Poland, Application no. 38016/07, Judgment of 3.2.2010, para. 66. 
112 Dementyev v. Russia (supra note 110), para. 31. 
113 Pressos Compania Naviera SA and others v. Belgium (supra note 81). 
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of the legislature with the administration of justice demand, under art. 6 
of the Convention, a higher threshold of justification, namely “compelling 
grounds of the general interest”.114 Therefore, the contracting state’s 
margin of appreciation under article 6 is substantially lower than under 
art. 1 of Protocol No. 1. In Maggio and others v. Italy,115 a case about an 
interpretative law on old-age pensions regulation, which influenced 
the outcome of pending litigation, the Court repudiated the financial 
arguments advanced by the Italian government thereby finding a violation 
of art. 6 of the Convention. At the same time, however, it ruled out 
a violation of art. 1, in view of the fact that the measure had not impaired 
the essence of the claimant’s pension rights and that it was intended to 
restore equality and avoid unjustified advantages.116 
But legitimate expectations can also surface irrespective of any 
connection with judicial proceedings. In our view, three additional 
sources of legitimate expectations are discernible in the ECtHR’s caseload. 
3.1.2. Pensions and Social Allowances
Th  first is related to pensions and social allowances in general.117 The 
Court as put forward a considerably solid set of principles in this regard, 
w ich emphasize that, although the ECHR does not guarantee the right 
114 See, among many others, Smokovitis and others v. Greece, Application no. 46356/99, 
Judgment of 11.7.2002, para. 23, Gorraiz Lizarraga and others v. Spain, Application 
no. 62543/00, Judgment of 10.11.2004, para. 64, Azienda Agricola Silverfunghi, A.A.S and 
others v. Italy, Application nos. 48357/07, 52677/07, 52687/07 and 52701/07, Judgment of 
24.9.2014, para. 76, Agrati and others v. Italy, Application no. 43549/08, 6107/09 and 5087/09, 
Judgment of 28.11.2011, para. 58, Maggio and others v. Italy, Application no. 46286/09, 
52851/08, 53727/08, 54486/08 and 56001/08, Judgment of 31.5.2011, para. 43, Stefanetti 
and others v. Italy, Application no. 21838/10, 21849/10, 21852/10, 21855/10, 21860/10, 
21863/10, 21869/10 and 21870/10, Judgment of 15.4.2014, para. 38. We refer only to cases 
where the court has assessed governmental measures under art. 6 of the Convention and 
art. 1 of Protocol No. 1, separately or in conjunction. 
115 Maggio and others v. Italy (supra note 114). 
116 See, by contrast, Stefanetti v. Italy (supra note 114), para. 66. 
117 On the issue, see I. Leijten, “Social security as a Human Rights issue in Europe”, 
ZaöRV, Vol. 2013, p. 177; T. Novitz, “Labour rights and property rights: implications 
for (and beyond) redundancy payments and pensions?”, Industry Law Journal, Vol. 41, 
20   |   Katarzyna Krupa-Lipińska 
 2.1.  ALL-OR-NOTHING APPROACH 
 
 The all-or-nothing approach is a result of a strict interpretation of the 
conditio sine qua non requirement. Case-law and doctrine in some European 
countries support this view. It is, then, crucial to establish a causal relation 
between the individually recognised tortfeasor and the damage and hold 
him/her liable in full16. Taking into account that the essence of problem  
of alternative causation is inherent evidentiary problems in establishing 
which tortfeasor actually caused the damage, some jurisdictions in which 
the all-or-nothing approach is accepted are using certain ways to overcome 
those difficulties for the plaintiff’s benefit. For example, in Belgium the 
court may be willing to find upon circumstances of the case that the 
damage was actually the result of the activity of one of defendants (his/her 
act was the actual cause of damage) and hold him/her liable17. In some 
jurisdictions facilitation for the plaintiff’s claim follows from the proper 
establishment of the standard of proof or burden of proof. In English18  
and Danish law the applicable standard of proof is the preponderance  
of evidence, which means that the requirement of causation is met if it is 
more probable than not (more than 50%) that the defendant caused  
the damage. A similar approach is taken by Italian law, which applies  
the “theory of the most probable cause”. 
 
 2.2.  JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
 
 In Book VI – 4:103 of Draft Common Frame of Reference the rebuttable 
presumption of causing damage in the case of alternative causes is 
prescribed. The article reads as follows: “Where legally relevant damage 
may have been caused by any one or more of a number of occurrences  
for which different persons are accountable and it is established that the 
damage was caused by one of these occurrences but not which one, each 
person who is accountable for any of the occurrences is rebuttably 
                                                   
16  See: Infantino, Zervogianni, supra note 4. 
17  See: Court of Appeal of Brussels, 23.12.1927, RGAR 1928, no. 227. 
18  Solution to the problem of alternative causation in England is one of the most 
complicated ones. Depending on a case, it may be also proportional liability or joint and 
several liability (see below). 
79Property Rights And Legitimate Expectations Under United States Constitutional Law…
to pension or to any social benefit, once the contracting State enacts 
legislation introducing any form of social security scheme, this must be 
regarded as generating a proprietary interest for persons satisfying the 
administrative requirements.118 
Hence, the ECtHR has overtly recognized that legislative amendments 
that, by setting different criteria of eligibility or reducing the level of 
benefits, affect the predictable and legitimate possibility of earning 
a certain amount of money should be treated as interferences with 
“possessions” under art. 1 of Protocol No. 1.119 Indeed, in Béláné Nagy v. 
Hungary,120 a case dealing with the termination of the applicant’s disability 
pension by virtue of a legislative amendment that changed the criteria on 
disability levels, the Court explained its reasoning in the following terms: 
“In these circumstances, the Court is satisfied that, once meeting the 
administrative requirements of the disability pension scheme as in force 
at the first material point in time (that is, in 2001), the applicant obtained, 
for the purposes of art. 1 of Protocol No. 1, a formal recognition of her 
legitimate expectation to receive a disability pension/allowance as and 
when her medical condition would so necessitate.”
Moreover, the Court has abandoned the distinction between 
contributory and non-contributory benefits for the purpose of applying 
art. 1 of Protocol No. 1,121 which means that the reduction of any of 
2012, p. 136; A. Tsetoura, “Property protection as a limit to deteriorating social security 
protection”, European Journal of Social Security, Vol. 15, 2013, p. 55.
118 See, in this regard, Béláné Nagy v. Hungary (supra note 106), para. 35, Klein v. Austria, 
Application no. 57028/00, Judgment of 3.3.2011, para. 42, Koufaki and Adedy v. Greece, 
Application no. 57665/12 and 57657/12, Judgment of 7.5.2013, para. 23, Budchenko 
v. Ukraine (supra note 97), para. 36, B. v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 36571/06, 
Judgment of 14.2.2012, para. 36. 
119 Béláné Nagy v. Hungary (supra note 106), para. 38; Banfield v. The United Kingdom, 
Application no. 6223/04, Judgment of 18.10.2005, para. 10; Stefanetti v. Italy (supra note 
114), para. 50; Kjartan Ásmundsson v. Iceland (supra note 79), para. 44; Klein v. Austria (supra 
note 118), para. 45. 
120 Béláné Nagy v. Hungary (supra note 106), para. 47. The case was referred to the 
Grand Chamber, that upheld the decision of the Chamber [Bélané Nagy, Application 
no. 53080/13, Judgment of 13.12.2016]. 
121 Stec and others v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 65731/01 and 65900/01, 
Judgment of 12.4.2006, and Béláné Nagy v. Hungary (supra note 106), para. 48, B. v. The 
United Kingdom (supra note 118), para. 36, and Andrejeva v. Latvia (supra note 74), para. 76. 
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these benefits could be envisaged as an interference with “possessions”. 
However, the distinction previously upheld by the Court remains 
significant insofar as the issue is to evaluate whether the applicant was 
called to bear an excessive and disproportionate burden.122 
Finally, upcoming social security benefits that are contingent on 
the information presented by the recipients only amount to possessions 
protected under art. 1 provided that the beneficiaries are in good faith.123 
This principle emerges with clarity from two rather similar cases – Moskal 
v. Poland,124 on the one hand, and B. v. The United Kingdom,125 on the other. 
The first case concerned the withdrawal of an early-retirement pension 
for persons raising children requiring constant care. The pension was 
issued based on a medical report that certified that the applicant’s son 
suffered from a pulmonary disease that demanded constant assistance by 
his mother. One year later, the social security authority cast doubts upon 
the accuracy of the medical certificate and, in consequence, discontinued 
the payment of the pension. In view of the factual record, the Court 
acknowledged that the applicant had applied for the early retirement 
pension “in good faith and in compliance with the applicable law”, and 
that she was justified in thinking that “unless there was a change in the 
condition of her child’s health the decision would not lose its validity”.126 
Accordingly, the applicant was found to have a substantive interest 
protected by art. 1 of Protocol No. 1. 
The second case relates to the discontinuance of a non-contributory 
personal allowance that was conferred upon the applicant based on her 
income and children. The applicant failed to notify the authorities that 
her children had been taken into care and that she had ceased to meet 
the conditions for receiving the allowance. Insofar as the recovery of 
overpaid benefit was concerned, the Court refused to acknowledge that 
the applicant had a proprietary interest under art. 1, because “to hold 
122 Béláné Nagy v. Hungary (supra note 106), para. 48; Stefanetti and others v. Italy (supra 
note 114), para. 63. 
123 B. v. The United Kingdom (supra note 118), para. 39. 
124 Moskal v. Poland, Application no. 10373/05, Judgment of 15.9.2009. 
125 B. v. The United Kingdom (supra note 118). 
126 Moskal v. Poland (supra note 124), para. 44. 
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otherwise would enable recipients of benefits to profit from their own 
omissions and in some cases fraud.”127
3.1.3. The Passage of Time in the Face of Invalid  
       or Precarious Administrative Action
Legitimate expectations can also originate from a situation where a state 
authority has issued a non-valid or precarious act which, by the lack 
of diligence of administrative bodies or by the time elapsed since its 
issuance, has given rise to the conviction that a beneficial patrimonial 
position would not be interrupted. 
This is rather frequent in cases dealing with private occupation of 
public property, such as coastal houses, dykes, and berths. For instance, 
in Brosset-Triboulet and others v. France,128 the Court handled the refusal, 
by the French authorities, to renew an authorization to occupy a deck 
and a house located on public land. It is worth mentioning that the 
authorization was precarious - it should not have lasted longer than 1990 – 
and expressly contained an obligation to restore the site to its original 
state once revoked. Nevertheless, the Court advanced that “the time that 
elapsed had the effect of vesting in the applicants a proprietary inte st 
in the peaceful enjoyment of the house that was sufficiently established 
and weighty to amount to a “possession” (…)”.129
Besides, there are a few cases where the Court accepted the existence 
of legitimate expectation under art. 1 despite the fact that the building 
permit issued by the planning authorities was invalid, as in Pine Valley 
v. Ireland,130 or that the building was erected without a planning permissio , 
127 B. v. United Kingdom (supra note 118), paras 39–40. 
128 Brosset-Triboulet and others v. France (supra note 87). See, similarly, Depalle v. France, 
Application no. 34044/02, Judgment of 29.3.2010, and Bellizzi v. Malta (supra note 107). 
129 Brosset-Triboulet and others v. France (supra note 87), para. 71 (emphasis added). 
130 Pine Valley Developments v. The United Kingdom (supra note 84). The applicant 
bought some acres of land in reliance of an outline planning permission that contravened 
the development plan. In consequence, the Supreme Court held that the permission had 
been ultra vires and was therefore a nullity. The Court highlighted that until the issuance 
of such decision, “the applicants had at least a legitimate expectation of being able to 
carry on their proposed development” (para. 51).
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as in Hamer v. Belgium.131 In the latter, the Court pointed out that, given 
the time elapsed since the construction (27 years) and considering that the 
applicant had paid taxes on the building, her proprietary interest in the 
enjoyment of her holiday home had given rise to a legitimate expectation 
of being able to continue to enjoy that possession.
Finally, situations in which there is a crucial connection between a not-
yet passed government’s act and a “possession” held by the applicant132 
should also deserve close attention. The best example is Centro Europa v. 
Italy.133 Indeed, the applicant was granted, in 1999, a licence for nationwide 
terrestrial television broadcasting, in virtue of which it was entitled to 
three frequencies. Given that the plan that would have allowed the 
allocation of frequencies was never implemented, the applicant was 
unable to broadcast until 2009. The Court emphasized the fact that, 
without the allocation of broadcasting frequencies, the licence to broadcast 
was “deprived of its substance”, and that the applicant held a legitimate 
expectation of being granted those frequencies. 
3.2. Legitimate Expectations as a Component  
     of “Fair Balance”
T e concept of legitimate expectations, in parallel with other components 
of the rule of law principle, is constantly convened at the balancing 
stage, that is to say after a “possession” under art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 
has been found.134 It is fair to say that, at the balancing stage, the Court 
pays special attention to both objective and subjective dimensions of 
legitimate expectations. 
It envisages the concept in rather objective terms,135 as a component 
of the rule of law, which demands that public powers act consistently 
131 Hamer v. Belgium (supra note 85), para. 76. 
132 Popelier, supra note 72, p. 15. 
133 Centro Europa 7 S.R.L and Di Stefano v. Italy, Application no. 38433/09, Judgment 
of 7.6.2012. See also Stretch v. The United Kingdom (supra note 80).
134 Perkmans, supra note 52, p. 119. 
135 M. Paparinskis, The International Minimum Standard and Fair and Equitable Treatment, 
Oxford, 2013, p. 235; Popelier, supra note 72, p. 10. 
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and transparently, according to the principles of good governance,136 
legal certainty,137 respect for acquired rights,138 and foreseeability as 
encompassing a duty to pass transitional relief measures.139 
The principle of good governance draws on the assumption that 
public authorities must act in good time and in an appropriate and 
consistent manner in correcting their mistakes. In Peter Matas v. Croatia, 
assessing a situation where a commercial building was estimated to 
have cultural heritage value and, therefore, was submitted to preventive 
protection during several years, the Chamber remembered that, under the 
principle of good governance, public authorities should have conducted 
measurements, assessments or studies in order to estimate the applicant’s 
building cultural heritage value in good time. 
The Court has scarcely ever admitted a violation of art. 1 solely on 
the basis of the public powers’ inconsistent or unscrupulous conduct, i.e. 
irrespective of the predictability and of the impact of the measure on the 
applicant’s patrimonial sphere.140 It is clear-cut, though, that the Court 
is inclined to rule against governmental measures that fail to meet those 
standards even if the applicant’s conduct lacks due diligence, a feature 
that evidences that the ECtHR standard is considerably more objective 
than, for instance, that of the US Supreme Court or of the European 
Court of Justice. 
136 See Moskal v. Poland (supra note 124), para. 72, Digryté Klibaviciené v. Lithuania, 
Application no. 34911/06, Judgment of 21.10.2014, para. 33, Lelas v. Croatia (supra note 
95), para. 74, and Jokela v. Finland (supra note 73), para. 65; Kalev v. Bulgaria, Application 
no. 9464/11, Judgment 10.11.16, para. 27, Kryvenkyy v. Ukraine, Application no. 43768/07, 
Judgment of 16.2.2017, para. 45. 
137 See, among others, Kehaya v. Bulgaria (supra note 75), para. 76, Decheva and others 
v. Bulgaria, Application no. 43071/06, Judgment of 26.9.2012, para. 57, and Solomun 
v. Croatia, Application no. 679/11, Judgment of 2.7.2015, para. 52; Stamova v. Bulgaria, 
Application no. 8725/07, Judgment of 19.1.2017, para. 70, Rusu Lintax Srl. v. The Republic 
of Moldova, Application no. 17992/09, Judgment of 13.12.2016, para. 13. 
138 See Béláné Nagy v. Hungary (supra note 106), para. 53; Jakeljic v. Croatia, Application 
no. 22768/12, Judgment of 28.6.2016, para. 45. 
139 Lekic v. Slovenia (supra note 98), para. 122. 
140 Padelletti, supra note 83, p. 84, seems to go even further by suggesting that the 
case law confers the highest significance to the public powers’ behaviour, independently 
of the applicant’s good faith and respect for the national legal system. 
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In Lelas v. Croatia,141 the Court conceded that the applicant could 
legitimately rely on the statements made by public officials “who appear 
to have the requisite authority to do so”. In Jokela v. Finland,142 the decisive 
consideration for finding a violation of art. 1 was neither the expropriation 
nor the inheritance tax, but the combined effect of both measures in the 
light of the lack of consistency depicted by public authorities. In fact, the 
market value fixed for the levying of inheritance tax was assessed to be 
four times higher per square metre than the market value applied in the 
expropriation proceedings. 
A very recent case, Werra Naturstein v. Germany,143 clearly evinces 
that public authorities’ conduct creates expectations even when the legal 
system openly enables interferences with the applicant’s investment. In 
short, the applicant was given a licence to quarry a limestone deposit for 
25 years at a time when the building of a motorway across the quarry 
was already being planned. Consequently, the applicant had to stop 
quarrying limestone and transferred its activities to a nearby mining 
site. He received compensation for the plot of land occupied by the 
motorway, but there was no formal expropriation of the mining licence. 
The court underlined that neither the mining authority nor the company 
could have reasonably been unaware of the planned motorway and of 
its priority over mining operations. However, the fact that the mining 
au hori y issued a licence during a period of uncertainty as to the exact 
location of the motorway indicated that a total lack of compensation 
was not justified. 
Foreseeability also plays a role in determining whether a fair balance 
was struck. It has been envisioned as a component of the lawfulness 
of th  interference, by imposing the duty to enact transitional relief 
measures. In a recent case, Lekic v. Slovenia, the court held that the 
principle of lawfulness presupposes that the provisions of domestic law 
are “foreseeable in their application”. Changing the rules of insolvency 
procedures, by allowing insolvent or inactive companies to be struck 
off from the court register without winding up, requires that inactive 
141 Lelas v. Croatia (supra note 95), para. 74. 
142 Jokela v. Finland (supra note 73), paras 61–65. 
143 Werra Naturstein v. Germany, Application no. 31377/12, Judgment of 19.1.2017, 
p ras 50–52. 
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and insolvent companies are provided with “sufficient time to institute 
appropriate proceedings”.144
On the other hand, several subjective features also come across in the 
case law. Indeed, special attention is given to the ideas of irreversibility, 
detrimental reliance, and the validity or legitimacy of expectations.145 The 
focal point is to know whether the applicants would have engaged in 
the same course of action or inaction if they had predicted the upcoming 
governmental changes detrimental to them. This is particularly relevant 
regarding pensions and social allowances. In the abovementioned Moskal 
v. Poland,146 the Court attached significant importance to the fact that, by 
resigning from her job in order to start receiving the pension, the applicant 
engaged in an irreversible and decisive course of action. Similarly, in 
Lakicevic and others v. Montenegro and Serbia,147 the Chamber took into 
consideration the fact that the pension system had encouraged pensioners 
to reopen their activities on a part-time basis whilst allowing them to 
continue receiving their pension in full. 
An opposite conclusion was reached in Azienda Agricola Silverfunghi 
A.A.S and others v. Italy,148 a case dealing with an authentic interpretation 
issued by the Italian authorities, which affected pending disputes 
concerning the accumulation of financial benefits in the agricultural sector. 
Here, the Court softened the relevance of the accumulation of benefits for 
the undertaken activities, considering that the applicants “were cl arly 
not in a position whereby they could not run their businesses because 
of the respective financial burdens.” 
The validity or legitimacy of expectations is also an important 
component of the balancing exercise. It is concerned not only with the 
probability of legal change in times of political uncertainty, but also
with the well-founded nature of those expectations in the light of the
144 Lekic v. Slovenia (supra note 98), para. 91; Lakicevic and others v. Montenegro and Serbia, 
Application no. 27458/06, 37205/06, 37207/06 and 33604/07, Judgment of 13.12.2011, 
para. 72. 
145 See also Stefanetti and others v. Italy (supra note 114), para. 65 [“the applicants made 
a conscious decision to move back to Italy at a time when they had legitimate expectations 
of receiving higher pensions and therefore a more comfortable standard of living”]. 
146 Moskal v. Poland (supra note 124). 
147 Lakicevic and others v. Montenegro and Serbia (supra note 144), para. 69. 
148 Azienda Agricola Silverfunghi, A.A.S and others v. Italy (supra note 114), para. 106. 
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substantive structure and values of the legal system. Both features were 
crucial in Jahn and Others v. Germany. The case focused on the Federal 
Republic of Germany’s Second Property Act, according to which land 
acquired under former German Democratic Republic’s Modrow Law 
should be reassigned to the public without the payment of compensation. 
The Modrow Law, it is worth mentioning, had lifted all restrictions on 
the disposal of land acquired under the land reform, whereupon those in 
possession of the land became its legitimate owners. The Grand Chamber’s 
reasoning was largely premised on the assumption that Germany, by 
reasons of social justice, had a duty to correct the heirs’ windfall gains 
under the loophole created by the Modrow Law.149 
The same reasoning has been applied in a context of financial 
uncertainty and distress as the one recently experienced in Greece. In 
Mamatas et autres v. Grèce, the court scrutinized the validity of some 
legislative measure concerning the Greek public debt, namely the 
collective action clauses, which forced bond holders to participate in 
an exchange of titles as long as at least two thirds of them agreed to it. 
The court followed the reasoning taken by the ECJ in a similar case, by 
stating that, given the speculative nature of the applicants’ investments, 
they should have been aware of the risks involving the debt purchased. 
The previous analysis has displayed that, contrary to what to some 
x ent occurs under the ECJ150 and the US Supreme Court, the subjective 
features of legitimate expectations do not always play a decisive role in 
determining whether a fair balance was struck. As a result, compensation 
might be paid even if the claimant, owing to his experience and know-
how, ought to have been able to anticipate the interference with its
149 Jahn and others v. Germany, Application no. 46720/99, 72203/01, 72552/01, Judgment 
of 30.6.2005, para. 116. U. Deutsch, “Expropriation without compensation – the European 
Court of Human Rights sanctions German Legislation expropriating the Heirs of “New 
Farmers”, German Law Journal, Vol. 6, 2005, p. 1367. 
150 D. Galetta, “Legittimo affidamento e leggi finanziarie, alla luce dell’esperienza 
comparata e comunitaria: riflessioni critiche e proposte per un nuovo approcio in materia 
di tutela del legittimo affidamento nei confronti dell’attività del legislatore” (Legitimate 
expectations and budgetary laws in the light of comparative and European Union Law: 
critical remarks and proposals for a new approach concerning legitimate expectations in 
legislative activity), Foro Amministrativo: TAR, 2008, p. 1917; Paparinskis, supra note 135, 
p. 230.
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possessions. Legal scholars have suggested that this difference is due to 
the margin of appreciation doctrine, i.e. due to the ECtHR’s refusal to 
double check member states’ policies especially, though not exclusively, 
in social policy matters and in times of political or economic distress.151 
The argument is that, while public authorities are afforded broad 
discretion in substantive issues, they must at least comply with some 
rather objective requirements such as good governance, non-retroactivity, 
or the enactment of transitional relief measures. 
To grasp the significance and justification of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine152 within ECtHR jurisprudence would seriously expand the scope 
of the present work. Notwithstanding, it is worth noting that the standard 
of review employed by the court varies according to the allegedly violated 
provisions of the ECHR. For instance, salary and pension cuts receive 
considerably different treatment depending on whether there is an 
interference with possessions, under art. 1 of Protocol no. 1, and/or an 
interference with the right to fair trial enshrined in art. 6. 
Under the former, the court weights a considerable number of 
factors in order to assess whether a fair balance was struck. It examines
the amount or percentage of the reduction, the enactment of transition 
151 Paparinskis, supra note 135, p. 237; R. Ergec, “Taxation and property rights under 
the European Convention on Human Rights”, Intertax, Vol. 39, 2011, p. 2 [“the more the 
court feels constrained to rely on the appreciation of national authorities on complex 
issues, the greater the temptation to check if at least these authorities reached their 
decision through a fair and contradictory procedure curbing the risk of arbitrariness to 
a minimum”]. 
152 Among many others, D. L. Donoho, “Autonomy and the margin of appreciation: 
developing a jurisprudence of diversity within universal Human Rights”, Emory International 
Law Review, Vol. 15, 2001, p. 391; G. Letsas, “Two concepts of the margin of appreciation”, 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26, 2006, p. 705; J. Gerards, “Pluralism, deference and 
the margin of appreciation doctrine”, European Law Journal, Vol. 17, 2011, p. 80; A. McHarg, 
“Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal 
Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights”, Modern 
Law Review, Vol. 62, 1999, p. 671; S. Greer, “The margin of appreciation: interpretation 
and discretion under the European Convention on Human Rights”, Human Rights Files, 
Vol. 17, 2000; E. Benvenisti, “Margin of appreciation, consensus and universal standards”, 
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol., Vol. 31, 1998, p. 843; J. A. Brauch, “The margin of appreciation 
and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: threat to the rule of law”, 
Columbia Journal of European Law, Vol. 11, 2005, p. 113. 
20   |   Katarzyna Krupa-Lipińska 
 2.1.  ALL-OR-NOTHING APPROACH 
 
 The all-or-nothing approach is a result of a strict interpretation of the 
conditio sine qua non requirement. Case-law and doctrine in some European 
countries support this view. It is, then, crucial to establish a causal relation 
between the individually recognised tortfeasor and the damage and hold 
him/her liable in full16. Taking into account that the essence of problem  
of alternative causation is inherent evidentiary problems in establishing 
which tortfeasor actually caused the damage, some jurisdictions in which 
the all-or-nothing approach is accepted are using certain ways to overcome 
those difficulties for the plaintiff’s benefit. For example, in Belgium the 
court may be willing to find upon circumstances of the case that the 
damage was actually the result of the activity of one of defendants (his/her 
act was the actual cause of damage) and hold him/her liable17. In some 
jurisdictions facilitation for the plaintiff’s claim follows from the proper 
establishment of the standard of proof or burden of proof. In English18  
and Danish law the applicable standard of proof is the preponderance  
of evidence, which means that the requirement of causation is met if it is 
more probable than not (more than 50%) that the defendant caused  
the damage. A similar approach is taken by Italian law, which applies  
the “theory of the most probable cause”. 
 
 2.2.  JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
 
 In Book VI – 4:103 of Draft Common Frame of Reference the rebuttable 
presumption of causing damage in the case of alternative causes is 
prescribed. The article reads as follows: “Where legally relevant damage 
may have been caused by any one or more of a number of occurrences  
for which different persons are accountable and it is established that the 
damage was caused by one of these occurrences but not which one, each 
person who is accountable for any of the occurrences is rebuttably 
                                                   
16  See: Infantino, Zervogianni, supra note 4. 
17  See: Court of Appeal of Brussels, 23.12.1927, RGAR 1928, no. 227. 
18  Solution to the problem of alternative causation in England is one of the most 
complicated ones. Depending on a case, it may be also proportional liability or joint and 
several liability (see below). 
88 Marta Nunes Vicente
relief measures, the discriminatory character of the interference, and 
the temporary/definitive character of the measures.153 Provided that 
the essence of the right is not impaired, the court is able to accept the 
legislator’s justifications concerning its course of action as being within 
the State’s margin of appreciation when regulating social policy issues. 
In Maggio and Others, the ECtHR underlined that the pension reduction 
“only had the effect of equalizing a state of affairs and avoid unjustified 
advantages”. Similarly, in Da Januário Conceição v. Portugal and Da Silva 
Carvalho v. Portugal, owing to the exceptional economic and financial 
crisis and to the insufficiency of previous measures, the court refused to 
decide whether better alternative measures could have been envisaged 
in order to reduce the state budget deficit.154 
However, the same kind of justifications are afforded considerably less 
weight when the issue is the temporal scope of application of retrospective 
legislation interfering with pending or upcoming judicial disputes. In 
Maggio and Others, the court was not persuaded that equalizing a state 
of affairs and avoiding unjustified advantages were compelling enough 
to justify a retrospective application of the law. More generally, as stated 
in Azienda Agricola Silverfunghi A.A.S and others v. Italy,155 “financial 
considerations cannot by themselves warrant the legislature substituting 
itself for the courts in order to settle disputes”.156
3.3. Conclusions on the Dual Role of Legitimate Expectations
The distinction between legitimate expectations as “possessions” and 
legitimate expectation as “a component of fair balance” is overly formal. 
It is true that, when brought forth at the balancing stage, the “legitimacy” 
153 Da Conceição Mateus and Santos Januário v. Portugal, Application no. 62235/12 
and 57725/12, Judgment of 8.10.2013, para. 25–28; Koufaki and Adedy v. Greece (supra note 
118), para. 31; Da Silva Carvalho Rico v. Portugal, Application no. 13341/14, Judgment of 
24.09.15, para. 45; Mamatas et autres v. Grèce, Application no. 63066/14, 64297/14, 66106/14, 
Judgment of 30.01.2017, para. 117; Bélané Nagy v. Hungary (supra note 106), para. 117, 
Kjartan Ásmundsson (supra note 79), para. 43. 
154 Da Conceição Mateus and Santos Januário v. Portugal (supra note 153), para. 28. 
155 Azienda Agricola Silverfunghi, A.A.S and others v. Italy (supra note 114), para. 82. 
156 Popelier, supra note 72, p. 17. 
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of the expectations acquires a different meaning. It signals no longer 
the likelihood of gaining money, but rather the unpredictability of 
a governmental change which is detrimental to the applicant’s patrimonial 
sphere.157 
As Allen puts it,158 the strength and legitimacy of these possessions are 
highly irregular, which might have some impact on the fair balance test. 
Similarly, we argue that holding a legitimate expectation as a possession 
does not always amount to holding a legitimate expectation under the 
balancing stage. Some cases suggest that the likelihood of obtaining 
a certain possession uncovers the pathway that the state organs are 
expected to pursue, thereby highlighting that holding a non-yet-existing 
possession pursuant to art. 1 empowers the applicant with a legitimate 
expectation of stability at the fair balance stage. That is why very often the 
Court undertakes balancing operations at the first stage of the analysis.159 
However, some of the elements considered at the balancing stage, such 
as the legitimacy of the expectations, evince that the connection between 
the two stages of analysis is not always automatic and that reasonable 
interruptions may occur.
4. Summary of Party II
Part II started with a description of the structure of art. 1 of Protocol no. 1. 
It comprises three different rules – peaceful enjoyment of possessions, 
deprivation of possessions, and control of the use of property – which 
give the provision enough flexibility to deal in an appropriate manner 
with all types of interferences with property rights. Our argument is that 
legitimate expectations play a dual role within the structure of art. 1, as
they work both as “possessions” and as an element to which should be 
given consideration at the balancing stage. 
157 See, for example, Kjartan Ásmundsson v. Iceland (supra note 79), para. 44, Huoltoasema 
Matti Éuren Oy and others v. Finland (supra note 87), para. 39, Digryté Klibaviciené v. Lithuania 
(supra note 136), para. 36, and Lindheim and others v. Norway (supra note 80), para. 133. 
158 Allen, supra note 1, p. 57. 
159 Gáll v. Hungary (supra note 94), paras 36–40; Kjartan Ásmundsson v. Iceland (supra 
note 79), para. 44. 
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As possessions, legitimate expectations bear some resemblance to 
the Supreme Court’s investment-backed expectations, since they indicate 
the likelihood of gaining money in view of the compliance with the 
requirements established in each legal system. These criteria have been 
confirmed in Kopecky v. Slovakia and are now firmly rooted in ECtHR 
case-law. We suggest that legitimate expectations originate from pending 
judicial proceedings, pensions, and social allowances, the passage of 
time regarding precarious or invalid administrative action, and, lastly, 
from situations where the applicant’s existing possession calls for an 
act by the government without which he would not have acquired that 
possession at all. 
At the balancing stage, and taken in broad terms, legitimate 
expectations refer to the unpredictability of the governmental interference 
with possessions. In our view, this unpredictability may come out from 
both objective and subjective elements. The argument is that the ECtHR’s 
approach towards stability puts considerable weight on the public 
authorities’ behaviour in order to overcome the leniency of the margin 
of appreciation doctrine. 
We conclude that, despite the different meaning attached to 
“legitimacy” in each of the stages of reasoning, there is some connection 
betw en expectations as possessions and expectations as an element of 
fair balance. 
III. Comparative Remarks
After carefully analysing how both systems address the same constitutional 
issue – the protection of property rights and patrimonial expectations 
in view of a legal change – we consider that we are ready to propose 
some comparative remarks, aimed at unveiling the main similarities and 
differences between the two systems.
1. Scope and Interferences with Property Rights
Both systems accept a broad definition of property rights in terms of 
including specific legal rights with economic value. The definition 
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encompasses monetary interests, even if they do not arise out of a specific 
and identifiable fund of money. The ECtHR has consistently held that 
taxation is in principle an interference with the right guaranteed by the 
first paragraph of art. 1 of Protocol no. 1, “since it deprives the person 
concerned of a possession, namely the amount of money which must 
be paid”.160 
Whereas the Supreme Court reviews taxation, namely retroactive 
taxation, under the due process of law clause, as we made clear from 
United States v. Carlton, the imposition of general financial liabilities 
has been considered, since Eastern Enterprises, as an interference with 
property rights which might be protected under the Fifth amendment. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer highlighted that the takings 
clause can apply to monetary interests provided that these interests 
arise out a “specific fund of money”. Other legal scholars seem to agree 
with him, raising the question of how to distinguish, after Eastern, the 
obligation to pay taxes from the obligation to pay money under a financial 
responsibility.161
No similar objections were raised under art. 1 of Protocol no. 1. This 
is owing to the different impact of the qualification. Within the human 
rights system, the imposition of financial liabilities or the levying of 
taxes will most certainly be reviewed pursuant to rules 1 or 3 of art. 1, 
the objective being to decide whether such interference manages to strike 
a fair balance. Different conclusions will arguably be reached under the 
Supreme Court’s all or nothing approach to the takings clause. At least 
one of the Penn Central’s tests will receive a straightforward answer: the 
economic impact is substantial because the company is deprived of the 
amounts it must pay to comply with the financial obligation.162 
It would be unfair to suggest that these issues did not exist prior to 
Eastern. As we pointed out in Part I, with regard to the takings clause, 
jurisprudence has sought to draw a distinction between (regulatory) 
takings and restraints on the use of property tantamount to public
160 Burden v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 13378/05, Judgment of 29.4.1998, 
para. 59; Imbert de Tremiolles c. France, Application no. 2583405 and 27815/05, Judgment 
of 4.1.2008. 
161 Krotoszynski, supra note 11, p. 729. 
162 Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel (supra note 56). 
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nuisances. Under the ECHR, a similar distinction exists between 
deprivation of possessions and regulations controlling the use of property. 
However, there are at least two major dissimilarities among these systems. 
First, under the ECtHR’s approach, the duty to compensate is not 
contingent on the label given to the interference. As M. Perkmans rightly 
asserted, “the characterization of a measure as a regulation does not per se 
exclude a right to compensation for the owner”.163 For instance, whereas in 
Miller v. Schoene,164 the Supreme Court empowered the government to cut 
unhealthy trees without paying compensation to the owner, in Chagnon 
et Fournier v. France,165 analysing the killing of animals for disease control 
purposes, the ECtHR gave due consideration to the compensation paid 
to the applicant as an element evidencing that a fair balance between the 
interests at stake had been achieved. 
Second, no categorical takings rule exists under art. 1 of Protocol 
No. 1. Although it is possible to find a deprivation (Rule 2) before the 
balancing stage, the economic impact of the measure on the investor’s 
possessions is never enough to trigger the duty to compensate. Jahn and 
others v. Germany is a good example of the latter assertion.166 
Thus, despite the shared intention of using the guarantee of 
property as a due process of law functional equivalent, it is self-evident 
that the current judicial interpretation of art. 1 (P1) makes it a rather 
more appropriate tool to use as a general standard of fairness than the 
Supreme Court’s on-going reading of the Fifth amendment. Though both 
dispositions are being interpreted as a guarantee against governmental 
action having a direct or indirect impact on patrimonial rights,167 only 
the latter has the structure to fulfil that function in a coherent manner. 
Finally, the flexibility of the scheme brought about by the ECtHR 
allows it to overcome the difficulties of identifying the claims of the 
second rule.168 This is not to say, however, that the classification carried 
by the court is void of material consequences regarding the validity of 
163 Perkmans, supra note 52 at p. 118. 
164 Miller v. Schoene (supra note 42). 
165 Chagnon et Fournier v. France (supra note 91), para. 57. 
166 Jahn and others v. Germany (supra note 149), para. 117. 
167 Allen, supra note 1, p. 282. 
168 Paparinskis, supra note 135, p. 179 and 234. See, in the case law, Stretch v. The 
United Kingdom (supra note 80), para. 36. 
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the measure. Effectively, when the court finds that a measure amounts to 
a deprivation - something that rarely occurs169 – the validity of the measure 
will most probably be contingent on the payment of compensation so that 
the fair balance of the governmental course of action can be preserved.170
2. Investment-backed Expectations and Legitimate  
  Expectations
The ECtHR’s approach vis-à-vis legitimate expectations holds some 
similarities to the Supreme Court’s investment-backed expectations. 
In fact, both concepts hinge on the same idea, i.e., the legal probability 
of income coupled with the assumption that the mere hope of acquiring 
money does not reserve protection. However, Sochacki’s171 observation 
that, as opposed to the Supreme Court, the ECtHR honours “significantly 
less vested, or even completely unvested, expectations” is also accurate. 
For example, the speculative or undue expectations of profit upheld 
as a “possession” in National & Provincial Building Society v. The United 
Kingdom172 were rejected as “investment-backed expectations” in 
Guggenheim v. City of Goleta.173 There are structural reasons for this tenet. 
Whereas under the ECtHR’s standpoint the existence of a “possession” 
is merely an admissibility issue, under the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
the recognition of an investment-backed expectation is a decisive step 
within the process of recognizing the occurrence of a taking. 
169 Paparinskis, supra note 135, p. 234; Padelletti, supra note 83; Allen, supra note 1; 
Escarcena, supra note 72 at p. 522. As opposed to the Supreme Court caseload, the refusal 
to grant building permits is not a de facto expropriation, but a control of use of property, 
as stated by the ECtHR in Fredin v. Sweden (supra note 87), para. 47, or Hellborg v. Sweden 
(supra note 80), para. 45. 
170 Brosset-Triboulet and others v. France (supra note 87), para. 94, Bruncrona v. Finland 
(supra note 78), para. 68, Draon v. France (supra note 104), para. 79, N.A and others. v. Turkey, 
Application no. 37451/97, Judgment of 11.10.2005, para. 41. 
171 Sochacki, supra note 30, p. 464. 
172 National & Provincial Building Society, The Leeds Permanent Building Society and the 
Yorkshire Building Society v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 21319/93, 21449/93 and 
21675/93, Judgment of 23.10.1997, para. 70. 
173 Guggenheim v. City of Goleta (supra note 42). 
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Expectations play a major role in evaluating the validity of pension 
reductions and public employees’ salary cuts. Under the contract clause, 
they evince the substantiality of the impairment of public contracts. 
Under art. 1 of Protocol no. 1, they help to establish whether the 
government’s interference struck a fair balance between the interests at 
stake. Interestingly, the factors considered in the weighting phase reveal 
considerable similarities. Both systems emphasize the irreversibility of 
the choices made by those already retired, the importance of transition 
relief periods and the contextual predictability of the normative change. 
In Allied Structural Steel, a case dealing with the impairment of a private 
pension fund,174 the Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature could 
not change the company’s obligations in an area where “the element of 
reliance was vital” and without approving “any provision for gradual 
applicability or grace periods”. Moreover, US courts have developed the 
highly-regulated industry exception,175 according to which legislative 
changes are more likely to occur when the area covered by the contract 
has been regulated in the past. Graham stresses that the highly-regulated 
industry exception is premised on the concepts of reliance and unfair 
surprise, which impose the “burden of uncertainty” on the investor 
by judging his knowledge of systemic factors. Within the ECtHR, no 
expectations are reputed to be “legitimate” in highly unstable economic 
and political environments. 
There is also a strong concern towards ensuring the economic viability 
of investment and the maintenance of property interests. The Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in the Keystone case176 can be traced in several ECtHR’s 
judgments, the most relevant of them being the cases dealing with rent 
control legislation, such as Hutten-Czapska v. Poland177 and Amato Gauci 
v. Malta.178 Indeed, in both cases the court found that the low levels of 
174 Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 US 234 (1978). 
175 R. A. Graham, “The Constitution, the Legislature, and Unfair Surprise: Toward 
a Reliance-Based Approach to the Contract Clause”, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 92, 1993, 
p. 398. 
176 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis (supra note 42). 
177 Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, Application no. 35014/97, Judgment of 19.6.2006, 
para. 224. 
178 Amato Gauci v. Malta, Application no. 47045/06, Judgment of 15.9.2009, para. 63. 
See, recently, Bittó and Others v. Slovakia, Application no. 30255/09, Judgment of 28.1.2014,
20   |   Katarzyna Krupa-Lipińska 
 2.1.  ALL-OR-NOTHING APPROACH 
 
 The all-or-nothing approach is a result of a strict interpretation of the 
conditio sine qua non requirement. Case-law and doctrine in some European 
countries support this view. It is, then, crucial to establish a causal relation 
between the individually recognised tortfeasor and the damage and hold 
him/her liable in full16. Taking into account that the essence of problem  
of alternative causation is inherent evidentiary problems in establishing 
which tortfeasor actually caused the damage, some jurisdictions in which 
the all-or-nothing approach is accepted are using certain ways to overcome 
those difficulties for the plaintiff’s benefit. For example, in Belgium the 
court may be willing to find upon circumstances of the case that the 
damage was actually the result of the activity of one of defendants (his/her 
act was the actual cause of damage) and hold him/her liable17. In some 
jurisdictions facilitation for the plaintiff’s claim follows from the proper 
establishment of the standard of proof or burden of proof. In English18  
and Danish law the applicable standard of proof is the preponderance  
of evidence, which means that the requirement of causation is met if it is 
more probable than not (more than 50%) that the defendant caused  
the damage. A similar approach is taken by Italian law, which applies  
the “theory of the most probable cause”. 
 
 2.2.  JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
 
 In Book VI – 4:103 of Draft Common Frame of Reference the rebuttable 
presumption of causing damage in the case of alternative causes is 
prescribed. The article reads as follows: “Where legally relevant damage 
may have been caused by any one or more of a number of occurrences  
for which different persons are accountable and it is established that the 
damage was caused by one of these occurrences but not which one, each 
person who is accountable for any of the occurrences is rebuttably 
                                                   
16  See: Infantino, Zervogianni, supra note 4. 
17  See: Court of Appeal of Brussels, 23.12.1927, RGAR 1928, no. 227. 
18  Solution to the problem of alternative causation in England is one of the most 
complicated ones. Depending on a case, it may be also proportional liability or joint and 
several liability (see below). 
95Property Rights And Legitimate Expectations Under United States Constitutional Law…
rent prevented the landlords from covering the “necessary maintenance 
expenses” and to “derive profits” from property, which amounted to 
a violation of art. 1 of Protocol No. 1. This guarantee might be important, 
in the future, regarding other strains of price regulation measures, like, 
for instance, the withdrawal of renewable energy support schemes or 
government interferences with energy prices after market liberalization.179 
3. Proportionality and Standards of Review
As U. Kriebaum rightly highlights,180 proportionality analysis does not play 
the same role in both property protection systems. Whereas under the 
Penn Central’s reading of the takings clause, the consideration of the nature 
and character of the government’s action depicts an ontological feature 
as a requirement for tracing a regulatory taking, in the Human Rights 
system it is used as a way of assessing the fairness of the government’s 
regulation. In other words, the principle of fair balance, as it is ordinarily 
called in ECtHR’s caseload, is an instrument that, having due regard to 
the elements of the case - such as the type of interference, the payment of 
compensation or the general interest pursued - helps to establish whether 
an individual was asked to bear an excessive burden.181 
Besides, we have argued that recent developments in Supreme Cour ’s 
jurisprudence have evinced the intention of reinforcing the protection 
of investors’ expectations, but also of affording greater certainty or 
predictability to the case-law. The idea is to curb the reserved powers 
doctrine and simultaneously to restrain the resort to any sort of balanci g
para. 113, Krahulec v. Slovakia, Application no. 19294/07, Judgment of 5.7.2016, para. 39, 
Apap Bologna v. Malta, Application no. 46931/12, Judgment of 30.8.2016, para. 57, Rudolfer 
v. Slovakia, Application no. 38082/07, Judgment of 5.7.2016, para. 43, Statileo v. Croatia, 
Application no. 12027/10, Judgment of 10.7.2014, para. 138. 
179 A. Boute, “The protection of property rights under the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the promotion of low-carbon investments”, Climate Law, Vol.1, 2010, 
p. 93; A. Boute, “Regulatory stability under Russian and EU energy law”, Maastricht 
Journal, Vol. 22, 2015, p. 506. 
180 Kriebaum, supra note 26, p. 730. 
181 Padelletti, supra note 83, p. 211.
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exercise or, at least, to keep it within well-defined bounds. Nollan/Dolan 
introduced a rough proportionality test in land development law and 
Koontz furthered its scope. 
Premised upon different assumptions, the ECtHR also tries to overcome 
the leniency of the margin of appreciation doctrine by giving teeth to 
some rather precise and unambiguous obligations. Public authorities 
are presumed to act in a non-contradictory, consistent and appropriate 
manner, and non-compliance with these requirements may trigger the 
duty to compensate. Nonetheless, provided that the legislature remains 
within the limits of its margin of appreciation, the ECtHR refuses to 
check whether better alternative measures could have been envisaged.182 
Conclusion
The study carried out in Parts I and II evinced how two different legal 
systems deal with the same “constitutional” issue: the impairment of 
patrimonial interests by a change in law. The fact that international 
investment law is deeply influenced by the SCOPUS caseload on the 
“takings” clause paves the way for conflict between investment arbitration 
and the European Court of Human Rights interpretation of article 1 of 
Protocol no 1. 
Whereas in overtly arbitrary situations, such as in Yukos183 – a case 
against Russia assessed both under the auspices of the Energy Charter 
Treaty and the ECHR – these conflicting features were somewhat blurred 
(apart from the compensation issue), future cases might emphasize the 
different inspiration and practical configuration of the limits imposed on 
governmental action by the multiple legal systems involved184. 
182 Da Silva Carvalho v. Portugal (supra note 153), para. 45. 
183 Yukos v. Russia, Application no. 14902/04, Judgment of 20.09.2011; and Yukos v. 
The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 227, Award, 18.07.2014. 
184 See, for instance, M. Fanou, V. Tzevelekos, The shared territory of the ECHR and 
international investment law, in: Y. Radi (eds.) Research Handbook on Human Rights and 
Investment, Edward Elgar, 2018, p. 93. 
